Towards a Neo-Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics by de Muynck, W. M.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
07
23
5v
1 
 3
1 
Ju
l 2
00
3
Towards a Neo-Copenhagen Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics
Willem M. de Muynck
Theoretical Physics, Eindhoven University of Technology,
POB 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
E-mail: W.M.d.Muynck@tue.nl
Abstract
The Copenhagen interpretation is critically considered. A number of ambiguities,
inconsistencies and confusions are discussed. It is argued that it is possible to purge
the interpretation so as to obtain a consistent and reasonable way to interpret the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, which is in agreement with the way
this theory is dealt with in experimental practice. In particular, the essential role
attributed by the Copenhagen interpretation to measurement is acknowledged. For
this reason it is proposed to refer to it as a neo-Copenhagen interpretation.
1 Introduction
Does quantum mechanics describe ‘just the phenomena’, or does it describe ‘reality
behind the phenomena’? Fifty or sixty years ago, under the influence of logical
positivism/empiricism the majority of physicists would presumably have given a
positive answer to the first question. Even today the influence of empiricism on the
interpretation of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is felt when us-
ing the term ‘observable’ to refer to a physical quantity represented by a Hermitian
operator. And even though neither Bohr nor Heisenberg can be reckoned a logical
positivist, their Copenhagen interpretation has been couched in the empiricist lan-
guage of ‘phenomena’. In particular, the emphasis placed on the essential role played
by the measurement arrangement has fostered the idea that quantum mechanics is
just dealing with phenomena to be observed in the course of a measurement.
But, in the meantime there has been a remarkable change of attitude. Following
Einstein’s criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation, to the effect that “Physics
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is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought independent of its be-
ing observed” ([1], p. 81), there has been a tendency to try to interpret quantum
mechanics as a description of an objective microscopic reality, ‘objective’ to be un-
derstood in the sense of ‘being independent of the observer including his measuring
instruments’. For instance, Bell [2]: “However the idea that quantum mechanics,
our most fundamental physical theory, is exclusively even about the results of ex-
periments would remain disappointing,” and: “To restrict quantum mechanics to be
exclusively about piddling laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise.”
Indeed, in quantum mechanics textbooks of the last few decades hardly any refer-
ence is being made at all to the measurement arrangement. Quantum mechanics
is presented as describing microscopic reality as it is supposed to be independently
of any measurement. Interpretations like the many-worlds interpretation (Everett
[3]) have been especially devised so as to expel measurement from the formulation
of the theory. In the following I will refer to such interpretations as ‘objectivistic-
realist interpretations of (the mathematical formalism of) quantum mechanics’ (cf.
section 11). It is the purpose of the present paper to question the appropriateness of
such objectivistic-realist interpretations, and to develop an interpretation in which
the Copenhagen concern about the relation established by measurement between
the microscopic object and the macroscopic world, is duly taken into account.
Unfortunately, the Copenhagen interpretation is far from unambiguous. Thus,
Bohr’s view with respect to the state vector is an instrumentalist one, in which
the state vector is considered as ‘just an instrument for calculating measurement
results’, thus opposing the realist view of an electron as a wave packet flying around
in space. By contrast, even though Bohr usually remained at a purely conceptual
level, and refrained from making ontological assertions, with respect to quantum
mechanical observables (“physical quantities”) his interpretation appears to be a
realist one (Folse ([4]), be it of a contextualistic blend in which a physical quan-
tity is well-defined only within the context of the measurement arrangement serving
to measure that quantity. In this respect it should be also noted that both Bohr
and Heisenberg virtually equate a ‘measurement result’ (i.e. a value of a quantum
mechanical observable) with a property of the microscopic object, possessed by the
object during (Bohr) or after (Heisenberg) the measurement. By von Neumann’s
projection postulate this contextualistic-realist interpretation of observables is ex-
tended to quantum mechanical states.
In the following sections I will first give a critical discussion of a number of
features of the Copenhagen interpretation. It will be seen that Feyerabend’s [5]
judgment that the ‘Copenhagen point of view’ is “not a single idea but a mixed
bag of interesting conjectures, dogmatic declarations, and philosophical absurdi-
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ties” is completely justified. Moreover, a number of inconsistencies will be found.
Nevertheless, the tendency to dismiss as irrelevant the Copenhagen concern with
measurement is certainly unwarranted, and -in disagreement with the often-heard
assertion that the best explanation of the quantum phenomena is that reality is
objectively described by quantum mechanics- not even plausible. On the contrary,
the fact that all knowledge we have about the quantum world is obtained by means
of measurement endorses Bohr’s intuition that our view of the world, laid down
in our theories, must be colored by the interaction between object and measuring
instrument. Therefore it is necessary to take this element of the Copenhagen in-
terpretation very seriously. It is important to note already here, however, that this
does not imply that it is possible to maintain a contextualistic-realist interpretation
in the Copenhagen sense referred to above. Instead, an empiricist interpretation
is proposed, in which a quantum mechanical observable refers to the measuring
instrument rather than to the microscopic object (cf. section 11).
In order to avoid misunderstandings it should be stressed here that in the follow-
ing a ‘measuring instrument’ is always taken to be a material object the microscopic
object is allowed to physically interact with. The human observer and his conscious-
ness can be left out of consideration. They are assumed not to have any physical
influence on the measuring process after the measurement arrangement has been
set up. Actually, in a quantum measurement the relation of a human observer to
a measuring instrument is not different from that in classical physics: his looking
at the (macroscopic) pointer of a quantum mechanical measuring instrument will
influence the measurement result (the pointer position) just as little as it does in
a classical measurement. Nowadays, quantum measurements are often completely
automated. The role of the human observer may even be restricted to looking at
the graphs produced by his printer. Therefore in the following all allusion to ‘mind’,
‘consciousness’, ‘free will’, and ‘psychophysical parallelism’ will be ignored as being
irrelevant to the subject. This implies that certain issues, like von Neumann’s ‘in-
finite regress’, ‘Wigner’s friend’, the ‘many-minds interpretation’, and ‘subjectivity’
will not be discussed.
2 Completeness of quantum mechanics
2.1 Two notions of completeness
In the discussion between Einstein and Bohr on ‘completeness of quantum mechan-
ics’ it is necessary to distinguish two different notions of ‘completeness’, to be re-
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ferred to as ‘completeness in a wider sense’ and ‘completeness in a restricted sense’,
respectively. The first notion is related to the impossibility of subquantum theories,
and can be formulated as follows:
No subquantum theory can yield a more detailed description of physical reality than
is provided by quantum mechanics (completeness in a wider sense).
A reason to believe in ‘completeness in a wider sense’ might be a positivist fear
of the metaphysical, rejecting hidden variables because of their unobservable, and
hence metaphysical, character. As observed by Feyerabend [5], Bohr accepted von
Neumann’s “proof” of the impossibility of hidden variables completing the quantum
formalism ([6], section IV.2), currently known to lack cogency (Bell [7]). Yet, this
was not the issue for Einstein when challenging Bohr’s ‘completeness’ idea. The
issue was rather different, viz.
The quantum mechanical description of a particle cannot be completed by determin-
ing precise values of position r and momentum p, because the disturbing influence
of the measuring instrument does not allow such a determination (completeness in
a restricted sense).
The reason why Bohr thought quantum mechanics to be a complete theory was
not any fear of the metaphysical. Instead, it is the existence of the ‘quantum of ac-
tion’, represented by Planck’s constant h, which is responsible for the impossibility
of a simultaneous precise determination of position and momentum of a particle.
For Bohr the concomitant impossibility of having a vanishing interaction between
microscopic object and measuring instrument implies the impossibility of a sharp
distinction between these objects, which therefore constitute an indivisible whole,
manifesting itself as a ‘quantum phenomenon’ (this is known as Bohr’s quantum pos-
tulate, e.g. [8]). Due to this circumstance position and momentum are each defined
with a certain latitude, which latitudes satisfy the Heisenberg uncertainty relation.
This issue is characteristic of quantum mechanics itself, and is quite independent
of the question of hidden variables (which transcends the domain of quantum me-
chanics). It is ‘completeness in a restricted sense’ that is the issue in the discussion
between Bohr and Einstein on the so-called ‘thought experiments’, culminating in
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) proposal [9], which should be seen as an ulti-
mate attempt from Einstein’s part to prevent an appeal by Bohr to the measurement
interaction in countering his objections.
Viewed in this way, the discussion between Einstein and Bohr on the complete-
ness of quantum mechanics is not at all about whether quantum mechanics is a
‘theory of everything’, not to be surpassed by any other more detailed theory. It
is rather about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, viz. whether a realist
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interpretation of quantum mechanical observables can be either objectivistic (Ein-
stein) or must be contextualistic (Bohr). It was Einstein’s conviction that a sound
physical theory must yield a description of an objective reality, and not merely of
a reality that is in interaction with an observer, or even with a measuring instru-
ment. The moon is there when nobody looks. The properties of matter, like electric
conductivity, radioactivity, etc., do not seem to be dependent on our observations;
we should try to devise theories describing these properties as being independent
of any observation. This idea is at the basis of the notion of ‘element of physical
reality’, introduced in the EPR paper [9], corresponding to a physical quantity the
value of which can be predicted with certainty without in any way disturbing the
system (cf. section 5). By Bohr [10] the unambiguity of this notion was challenged
precisely because of its non-contextuality, ignoring that the (whole) experimental
arrangement must be taken into account when discussing quantum phenomena.
It is important to stress here that by EPR an element of physical reality was
presented as a quantum mechanical measurement result, which, for this reason, could
be equated by Bohr to a ‘quantum phenomenon’. Indeed, the discussion took place
completely within the domain of quantum mechanics. No hidden variables, hence,
no ‘completeness in a wider sense’ were involved. As far as hidden variables might
be thought to be involved, the question just is whether the quantum mechanical
observables themselves can play the roles of hidden variables, in the sense that to a
particle a well-defined value of an observable can be attributed, possessed prior to,
and independently of measurement. However, this is a matter of the interpretation
of quantum mechanics (either objectivistic-realist or contextualistic-realist) rather
than a fundamental change to a more encompassing theory. It should be borne in
mind that this focussing of the attention on quantum mechanical notions has severely
restricted the scope of physical reasoning. Thus, in this way the possibility is not
taken into account that Bohr might be right in attributing a contextual meaning to
quantum mechanics, but that Einstein’s ‘element of physical reality’ might be given
an unambiguous meaning when viewed as a non-quantum mechanical concept. By
disregarding the latter possibility it became possible that Bohr’s victory with respect
to the issue of ‘completeness in a restricted sense’ was generally misinterpreted as
a victory with respect to ‘completeness in a wider sense’, denouncing Einstein’s
introduction of ‘elements of physical reality’ as a metaphysical endeavor.
The idea that quantum mechanics might be ‘complete in a wider sense’ is a very
unusual one, not applicable to any of the physical theories developed in the past.
Therefore it is not clear at all why we might want to apply it to quantum mechanics.
Admittedly, this theory has a very large domain of application, and it is not clear
under which physical circumstances its boundaries might come into sight. But this
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was true as well for the theory of classical mechanics, including Maxwell’s field
theory, which encompasses virtually all of physics known 100 years ago (compare
Kelvin [11]). Nevertheless, 20th century physics has been dominated by quantum
mechanics and relativity theory, and the classical theory has been recognized to be
valid only if masses are sufficiently large and velocities are small compared to the
velocity of light. Quantum mechanics does not seem to be so well understood that
something analogous could not be expected (for instance, for measurement processes
monitoring very short times, cf. section 12).
The idea that quantum mechanics is ‘complete in a wider sense’ can hardly
be attributed to either Einstein, Bohr or Heisenberg, who were open-minded to
the possibility that quantum mechanics may have to be superseded by still more
advanced theories. If the idea of ‘completeness in a wider sense’ can be attributed
to the Copenhagen interpretation at all, it is because this interpretation is not a
consistent theory, but a set of ideas stemming from different sources. One such
source is the empiricist philosophy of science which was dominating the first half of
the 20th century. In a certain fundamentalist form (often referred to as anti-realism)
the empiricist philosophy not only advocated to be very cautious about theoretical
concepts not based on observation, but it even declared objects corresponding to
such concepts to be non-existent (for instance, atoms, the world aether). If taken
seriously, application of this advice to atoms would presumably even have been an
impediment to their experimental discovery. Although it may not be advisable to
assume the physical existence of every theoretical notion we may be able to think
of, the opposite attitude does seem to be equally unproductive. As a means of
promoting science, ‘fear of the metaphysical’ has its boundaries. Sometimes a leap
of imagination may be advantageous.
Up to now our experience has been that behind the phenomena described by a
certain theory there is a wealth of new physics to be described by more penetrating
theories. Thus, the behavior of a billiard ball as observed by a billiard player is
adequately described by the classical theory of rigid bodies. However, we need solid
state physics to take into account its atomic constitution. By analogy, it would be
rather frivolous to assume that quantum mechanics is the “theory of everything”,
never to be superseded by more encompassing (subquantum) theories. Even though
at this moment we do not have any experimental indication with respect to the
boundaries of the domain of application of quantum mechanics (at least in its gen-
eralized form, cf. section 10), the idea of ‘completeness in a wider sense’ would be
inappropriate from a methodological point of view. As a matter of fact, it is by
now well known that the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, as presented
in quantum mechanics textbooks, is not able to describe all measurements possible
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within the quantum mechanical domain (e.g. de Muynck [12]). For this reason, at
least textbook quantum mechanics cannot be ‘complete in a wider sense’. It will not
be demanded in developing a neo-Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
2.2 Objectivity and contextuality
There is yet another lesson to be learned from the billiard ball analogy. It is widely
assumed that, in contrast to quantum mechanics, classical mechanics yields an ob-
jective description of reality, not needing any reference to observation. From the
example we see that this is not generally true. Rigidity is not an objective property
of a billiard ball. Due to its atomic constitution, a billiard ball behaves as a rigid
body only under certain circumstances. If hit hard enough it may start to vibrate,
and may even split. Hence, the theory of rigid bodies is applicable only within a
certain domain of experimentation, and, therefore, has only a contextual meaning,
quite analogous to Bohr’s view on the contextual meaning of quantum mechanical
observables. As far as Einstein’s idea of the desirability of an objective description
might have its origin in a classical paradigm, this seems to be unwarranted. More-
over, it is evident that, analogous to Bohr’s contention with respect to quantum
mechanical observables, for a rigid body description of a billiard ball the context is
determined by the whole experimental arrangement. This implies that ‘rigidity of a
billiard ball’ is a contextual property even if no observation is made at all. Einstein’s
requirement of objectivity of the quantum mechanical description might be justified
if quantum mechanics were ‘complete in a wider sense’. This seems to be too strong
a requirement, though.
However, Einstein’s requirement of ‘objectivity’ is not related to the issue of
‘completeness in a wider sense’. Indeed, his quarrel with Bohr was about ‘complete-
ness in a restricted sense’. It was unacceptable to Einstein that properties of a world,
existing independently of the observer, would depend on its being observed. Indeed,
it would be preposterous to assume that the rigidity of a billiard ball is dependent
on its being looked at, or that the moon would not exist if it is not observed by any
observer. The billiard ball example can teach us how this conundrum can be solved,
both for classical and quantum mechanics. For this purpose it is advantageous to
assume ‘incompleteness in a wider sense’ of these theories.
It is important to take into account the physical reason why a billiard ball is
rigid, even if it consists of vibrating atoms. This reason, of course, is that, due to
the tight bindings between the atoms within the ball, the vibrations are so small that
they are not observed at the macroscopic level of observation to which the theory
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of rigid bodies is applicable. We should distinguish ‘reality’ from our ‘description
of reality’. A billiard ball is not “really” a rigid body; we can only describe it as
one as long as it behaves accordingly. Hence, as far as rigidity is a property of
the ball, it is a contextual property. Taking into account atomic vibrations makes
this clear. Moreover, it demonstrates that for a description of these vibrations we
need a theory different from rigid body theory (for instance, an atomic theory of
the solid state). The contextual meaning of rigid body theory is evident because
the concept of ‘rigidity’ loses its meaning when the atomic vibrations are no longer
negligible. Actually, we should distinguish two concepts of ‘rigidity’, the ‘rigidity’
concept of rigid body theory being quite different from that of an atomic theory of
the solid state. An interesting question is also whether, in contrast to the concept of
‘rigidity’ of rigid body theory, the atomic theory does yield an objective description
of atomic vibrations, or whether under certain conditions these vibrations may lose
their meaning too. However, this subject will not be pursued here any further.
For quantum mechanics the situation may be analogous. Submicroscopic (hidden
variables) concepts of position and momentum may be different from the correspond-
ing quantum mechanical concepts. Bohr may be right that, like rigidity, quantum
mechanical observables too have a contextual meaning only. If so, a subquantum
theory will be necessary to yield the objective description Einstein aspired to. Possi-
bly, Einstein’s requirement that quantum mechanics itself yield such a description is
unnecessarily asking too much of this latter theory. We have some indications that
this, indeed, may be the case. Thus, although at the time of the Bohr-Einstein dis-
cussion it was an open question whether values of quantum mechanical observables
can be attributed to the microscopic object as objective properties (this possibility
was denied by the Copenhagen interpretation on dubious grounds, cf. section 2.3),
by the Kochen-Specker theorem and its generalizations [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], as well
as by certain derivations of the Bell inequalities (e.g. [12], section 9.4.1), we are
convinced now that such an attribution is impossible. Hence, in general it is impos-
sible to assume that a free particle had a well-defined value of quantum mechanical
momentum prior to measurement. This is one of the basic tenets of the Copen-
hagen interpretation, advocated in particular by Jordan [18], but generally felt to
characterize this interpretation’s view on the issue of (in)determinism, which (in-
deterministic) view -as is well known- was rejected by Einstein. His assertion that
God does not play dice may be interpreted as expressing a conviction that in an
ideal measurement an observation of a quantum mechanical measurement result
can be explained because the observable had its value prior to the measurement.
This is sometimes referred to as a principle of ‘faithful measurement’ (e.g. Redhead
[19]). It seems that at least on the issue of the objectivity of quantum mechanical
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measurement results Bohr can be granted a victory over Einstein, even though it is
questionable whether this extends to the issue of (in)determinism.
2.3 To explain or not to explain
The distinction between ‘quantum mechanical measurement results’ and ‘subquan-
tum elements of physical reality’ will play an important role in my attempt to free
the Copenhagen interpretation from a number of features reducing its trustworthi-
ness. Jordan’s ‘creation-out-of-the-blue’ philosophy is one of these. The Copenhagen
abandonment of explanation of a measurement result by referring to a property of
the microscopic object, possessed prior to measurement (for instance, according to
Jordan [18] before a position measurement a particle is “neither here, neither there”)
has been a bone of contention to those believing, with Einstein, that a decent phys-
ical theory must tell us something about objective reality. Indeed, the Copenhagen
idea of ‘indeterminism’ is based on a conviction that quantum mechanics cannot
be completed by means of so-called hidden variables. This conviction is based on
von Neumann’s “proof” of the impossibility of the existence of hidden variables ([6],
section IV.2), which, however, was demonstrated by Bell [7] not to be cogent (see
also Feyerabend [20]). Hence, it is possible that here the Copenhagen interpretation
underestimates the capacity of quantum mechanics to account for certain features
of reality. Perhaps Heisenberg does not even follow Jordan all the way when he
interprets his uncertainty relation as referring to mutual disturbance of position and
momentum in a simultaneous measurement of these observables. Indeed, this seems
to imply that an observable is not disturbed by an ideal measurement of that very
observable, suggesting that, in agreement with the principle of ‘faithful measure-
ment’, prior to measurement the observable must have had the same value it has
after the measurement. Even though, due to the Kochen-Specker and Bell theo-
rems, this cannot be literally true, Heisenberg’s intuition might be correct in the
sense that, contrary to Jordan’s contention, a quantum mechanical measurement
may yield evidence on a previously existing ‘element of physical reality’, which can-
not be described by quantum mechanics, however, but which has to be described by
a subquantum theory. Note, too, that Bohr has repeatedly warned against the idea
that during measurement a quantum mechanical measurement result is created (as
a property of the microscopic object).
Measurements of correlations between two observables may provide even more
pressing arguments for the existence of ‘subquantum elements of physical reality’.
Consider, for instance, a free particle, for which the momentum observables P (t)
and P (t′) commute for all values of the times t and t′. It, therefore, follows from the
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mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics that two consecutive measurements
of momentum of a free particle will yield the same measurement result. The perfect
correlation between the results of two consecutive momentum measurements could
be explained in a natural way by conservation of momentum, combined with the fact
that, due to the commutativity of the momentum operators P (t) and P (t′), the mea-
surements of these observables do not mutually disturb. The perfect correlations of
the measurement results would be completely unexplained if they were not reducible
to some feature of the microscopic reality behind the measurement phenomena. A
desire to explain a similar perfect correlation of quantum mechanical observables of
two different particles in the EPR experiment may be responsible for the idea that,
if the measured quantities cannot be objective properties of the particles, possessed
prior to measurement, nonlocal influences between distant measurements must be
involved.
Even though values of Hermitian operators (analogous to the rigidity concept of
rigid body theory) cannot play the roles of ‘elements of physical reality’, this does
not imply that they would not refer to some aspect of reality that is actually probed
by the measurement of the corresponding observable. Thus, quantum mechanical
momentum of a particle may refer to some subquantum notion of ‘momentum’, re-
lated to the quantum mechanical notion in a way analogous to the relation between
the notion of ‘rigidity’ of rigid body theory and its representation in atomic solid
state theory: conservation of momentum may be compared to conservation of the
spherical shape of the surface of a billiard ball caused by the (approximate) preserva-
tion of the relative positions of the atoms; whereas under standard conditions these
features strictly correspond to our observations, a description by the more detailed
theory may account for deviations which become important under non-standard
conditions.
Einstein’s reluctance to grant completeness to quantum mechanics was not in-
duced by any preference for the determinism of classical mechanics, but rather by
the idea that our physical theories must tell us something about the world as it
exists objectively and independently of measurement. Although this ideal may not
be applicable to all physical theories (e.g. rigid body theory), and, in particular, not
to quantum mechanics, it is not too far-fetched to assume with Bohr that quantum
mechanics at least may tell something about a contextual reality that is in inter-
action with a measuring instrument. Nor does it mean that no other explanations
can be attempted. As a matter of fact, within the Copenhagen interpretation such
an attempt is made by invoking von Neumann’s projection postulate, trying to ex-
plain the strict correlation between consecutively measured values of momentum by
assuming that a momentum measurement projects the quantum state into an eigen-
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state of the measured observable. However, von Neumann’s projection postulate
is inapplicable to most measurement procedures (e.g. de Muynck [12], chapter 3).
Moreover, as an explanation it does not seem to be very plausible if compared with
the possibility that ‘conservation of momentum’ tells us something about a property
of the object that is conserved while it is not interacting with a measuring instru-
ment (an ‘element of physical reality’). It seems evident that, if quantum mechanical
observables have a contextual meaning only, such a property, if existing, must have
a non-quantum mechanical nature.
Of course, it is possible to refrain from any explanation of correlations of con-
secutive quantum mechanical measurement results like the one discussed above, or
of the strict (EPR) correlations obtained in a simultaneous measurement of the z-
components of the spins of a spin-1/2 particle pair prepared in the singlet state. This
would suit a strictly empiricist view of quantum mechanics (e.g. van Fraassen [21]),
in which it is deemed sufficient that a physical theory just describes the phenomena,
without any necessity to explain them. As is evident from its adoption of von Neu-
mann’s projection postulate, the Copenhagen interpretation does not hold to this
strictly empiricist view. It does not refrain from explanation. On the contrary, it
seems to be so inclined toward explanation that it is ready to accept a suspect proce-
dure like von Neumann’s projection postulate as a means of explaining correlations
in consecutive or in joint measurements. It seems to me that, in devising a neo-
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, we should maintain the demand
that physical theories provide explanations, but we must accept that, like rigid body
theory, also quantum mechanics may not explain everything. In particular, it does
not explain why a certain measurement result is obtained when a measurement of a
quantum mechanical observable is carried out. For such an explanation, if it exists,
we will have to resort to more detailed (subquantum) theories, much in the same
way rigidity of a billiard ball is explained by the tight bindings between the atoms
within the ball, to be described by a sub-rigid body theory. If quantum mechan-
ics is not ‘complete in a wider sense’, we may expect that subquantum theories will
once be found. Far from being methodologically objectionable, subquantum (hidden
variables) theories may be illuminating by allowing different levels of discourse.
3 Individual-object (individual-particle) versus en-
semble interpretation of the wave function
The question of whether quantum mechanics is ‘complete’ is often formulated in
terms of the wave function or state vector. Einstein was very clear at that. Accord-
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ing to him “the ψ-function is to be understood as the description not of a single
system but of an ensemble of systems” (Einstein [22], p. 671). He thought that our
inability to yield a more precise description than a statistical one is a consequence
of our ignorance about the precise values of position and momentum of a parti-
cle. According to the Copenhagen interpretation such an ensemble interpretation
is not suitable for quantum mechanics, because it is in disagreement with the idea
of ‘completeness in a restricted sense’ (cf. section 2.1), disallowing an object to
simultaneously have well-defined values of position and momentum1. According to
the Copenhagen interpretation the wave function must be seen as a fundamentally
probabilistic (as opposed to statistical) description of an individual object, allow-
ing for the essential indeterminism which is a consequence of ‘completeness in a
restricted sense’. The difference between the Copenhagen individual-particle inter-
pretation and Einstein’s ensemble one marks their fundamentally different attitudes
with respect to explanation of quantum mechanical measurement results.
Sometimes the distinction between an ensemble interpretation and an individual-
object interpretation is characterized in terms of the distinction between an epis-
temic and an ontic interpretation, respectively (e.g. Primas [23]), juxtaposing ‘de-
scription of our knowledge’ to ‘description of reality’. It seems to me, however, that
this is a potentially misleading distinction, introduced in the first place to discredit
an epistemic interpretation as being part of psychology, not physics. It should be
noted, however, that, independently of its interpretation, a physical theory is a rep-
resentation of our knowledge (about some part of reality), and, therefore, is always
epistemic. This holds true for the wave function as well, independently of whether it
is considered as a description of an individual particle or of an ensemble. Contrary
to what is intimated by an ontic interpretation, an electron is not a wave function
flying around in space. Electrons belong to physical reality, wave functions can be
found in quantum mechanics textbooks.
I will not discuss here any further the question of whether the Copenhagen in-
terpretation is ontic in the sense given above, because it seems to me that different
adherents to this interpretation may give different answers (often couched in a termi-
nology referring to the objectivism/subjectivism dichotomy). For instance, it seems
evident that Bohr’s (instrumentalist) interpretation of the wave function is not on-
tic. However, as already remarked in section 1, there has been a strong tendency
towards an ontic interpretation, considering a wave function to describe the reality
1Here it is temporarily ignored that in the Copenhagen interpretation a quantum mechanical
measurement result is generally interpreted as a post-measurement property of the object. The
Copenhagen lack of distinction between pre- and post-measurement properties will be discussed in
section 8.
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of an individual microscopic object, much in the same way as the theory of rigid
bodies seems to describe the reality of a billiard ball (see also section 11). Nowa-
days the ‘epistemic’ terminology has become acceptable again by stressing that the
wave function must be seen as representing information which is available about
the object. This would be a step forward if the experimental means, necessary to
obtain this information, are not left out of consideration (which is seldom the case,
however).
Unfortunately, reliance on the distinction ‘epistemic versus ontic’ has had a con-
siderable impact. Thus, in the distinction between ‘statistical’ and ‘probabilistic’
interpretations of the quantum mechanical formalism it has been assumed that the
latter interpretation implies indeterminism in an ontic sense rather than in the epis-
temic sense of lack of knowledge. It must be stressed, however, that we do not have
any hard experimental evidence for such a contention. The arguments advanced by
the Copenhagen and other interpretations in favor of an individual-particle interpre-
tation of the wave function are based on an unwarranted lack of distinction between
microscopic reality itself and its quantum mechanical description. For this reason I
will not consider the epistemic/ontic dichotomy any further, but I will focus here on
the individual-particle/ensemble dichotomy in which a quantum mechanical wave
function may refer to either one of two different objects, both “ontically” existing
in reality, viz. an individual object or an ensemble of such objects, realizing that in
both cases the quantum mechanical description is an approximate one.
One prominent argument in favor of an ensemble interpretation of the wave
function or state vector is the fact that quantum mechanical probabilities can be
experimentally approached only by repeating an experiment a large number of times,
and by determining relative frequencies of measurement outcomes. The possibility
of an individual-particle interpretation then hinges on the question of whether all
individual preparations in an ensemble are ‘identical preparations’, not allowing any
specification by which they could be distinguished. By Von Neumann [6] this was
taken up as signifying homogeneity of an ensemble described by a wave function
(in contrast to the apparent inhomogeneity of a von Neumann ensemble described
by a non-idempotent density operator). I will now discuss two reasons why I think
that an individual-particle interpretation of the wave function is undesirable, even
though at this moment this is not strictly falsifiable due to lack of any possibility to
distinguish, other than by the measurement results obtained in quantum mechanical
measurements, between individual realizations of members of an ensemble described
by a wave function.
As a first reason, let us consider a particle impinging on a double-slit system.
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Nowadays such experiments are no longer ‘thought experiments’. For instance, in
neutron interferometry such experiments are routinely performed (e.g. [24, 25, 26]).
In an individual-particle interpretation such experiments immediately entail a con-
ceptual problem. As a matter of fact, the wave function is split into two parts, each
corresponding to one of the slits. This is sometimes interpreted as ‘the particle go-
ing through both slits at the same time’. A more appropriate interpretation might
be thought to be the Copenhagen one, to the effect that within the experimen-
tal arrangement the particle concept is not well-defined, and a ‘wave’ terminology
should be used to interpret what is going on (particle-wave duality). Unfortunately,
the Copenhagen idea of particle-wave duality, asserting that, depending on the ex-
perimental arrangement, a quantum mechanical object “is” either a particle or a
wave, must be considered obsolete by now. In interference experiments both particle
and wave aspects can be observed within one and the same experimental arrange-
ment. For instance, in interference experiments with electrons and neutrons it is
possible to see a gradual development of the interference pattern, built up by local
(particle-like) impacts exhibiting particle-like and wave-like behavior in one and the
same measurement arrangement (compare figure 4.4 of de Muynck [12]). This ex-
perimentally demonstrates that in interference experiments the wave aspect of the
phenomenon cannot be explained by considering an individual particle as a wave
(which, incidentally, would be analogous to explaining rigidity of a billiard ball by
means of a model of closely packed rigid atoms). For Bohr this has been occasion
to revise his views, to the effect that electrons, protons and neutrons are considered
by him to be always particles, whereas light would always be a wave, photons being
artefacts of the quantum mechanical description (cf. Murdoch [27]).
Indeed, it is consistent with all experimental evidence to assume that electrons
and neutrons maintain a particle-like behavior while passing through the interfero-
meter. If detectors are placed within the interferometer, the particle is always found
in one of the possible paths, never in both paths at the same time. Something similar
is observed when a photon is allowed to impinge on a semi-transparant mirror (hence,
it seems that in this respect Bohr’s revised view is questionable as well). Whereas
the wave function is split into approximately equal parts (transmitted and reflected
parts), the photon travels one way or the other, as can be observed by putting
photon counters in each of the outgoing directions. Evidently, if the wave function
were interpreted as a description of a single particle or photon, the object (wave?)
would be equally in both paths. This does not seem to be in agreement with the
results of optical experiments, however.
In the Copenhagen probabilistic interpretation of the wave function a particle
ontology is employed, but it is thought to be undefined whether the particle is in one
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path or the other; it might even jump to and fro between the paths. Analogously to
the case of conservation of momentum, discussed above, we have no reason to believe
that in a position measurement von Neumann projection is the reason that we find
the object in one and the same beam when consecutive position measurements are
carried out. For an explanation of this it is far more reasonable to appeal to inertia
as a general property of matter, valid in the microscopic domain as well (although,
possibly, not in the classical mechanical sense). The reason of the assumption of
indeterminism by the Copenhagen interpretation might be also a consequence of an
ill-founded idea of ‘completeness of quantum mechanics in a wider sense’, precluding
a distinction between quantum mechanical measurement results and (non-quantum
mechanical) properties of the microscopic object. Einstein’s statistical (ensemble)
interpretation of the wave function is no less in agreement with experiment, and its
determinism in the sense of ‘faithful measurement’ seems to be quite a bit closer to
what should be expected from a physical theory. For this reason it seems to be more
promising to try to remedy shortcomings of this ‘ensemble’ approach than to keep
trying to circumvent the paradoxes going with an individual-particle interpretation.
One of these paradoxes is discussed in the next section. It yields a second reason to
doubt the possibility of an individual-particle interpretation of the wave function, if
the particle is considered in von Neumann’s sense as a member of a homogeneous
ensemble.
4 (In)homogeneity of ensembles
When the idea of ‘homogeneity of an ensemble described by a pure state’ is applied
to an entangled state
|ψ12〉 =
∑
ij
cij |α1i〉|β2j〉, cij 6= c1ic2j , (1)
{|α1i〉} and {|β2j〉} orthonormal sets in the Hilbert spaces of particles 1 and 2,
respectively, we are confronted with a consistency problem. By taking a partial
trace of the density operator ρ12 = |ψ12〉〈ψ12|, the state of particle 1 is obtained as
ρ1 = Tr2ρ12 =
∑
j
rj |φ1j〉〈φ1j|, |φ1j〉 =
∑
i
cij
r
1/2
j
|α1i〉, rj = ‖
∑
i
cij |α1i〉‖
2. (2)
The important point is that ρ1 does not describe a pure state but a von Neumann en-
semble, which, allegedly, is inhomogeneous. However, since particle 1 is a subsystem
of the two-particle system described by the pure state (1), we do not have any means
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to distinguish between different members of the (allegedly homogeneous) ensemble,
also if only one of the particles is considered. Hence, it would seem that the particle
1 ensemble must be homogeneous too. This poses the question of whether ρ1, given
by (2), describes a homogeneous or an inhomogeneous ensemble, the latter answer
implying an inconsistency if the pure state (1) would correspond to a homogeneous
one.
The question cannot be answered straightforwardly in an unambiguous way. As
a matter of fact, for every density operator of the type (2) an entangled state of
the form (1) can be constructed such that the density operator can be obtained by
taking a partial trace. If pure states are homogeneous, this would seem to imply that
ensembles of the type described by (2) must be homogeneous too. This is one way to
try to prevent the above-mentioned inconsistency: consider all quantum mechanical
ensembles, either pure states or mixtures, as homogeneous. This is actually done
in the minimal interpretation advocated by e.g. Park and Band [28, 29]. In this
way a problem of von Neumann’s interpretation, caused by the non-uniqueness of
the decomposition of the ensemble described by density operator (2) into distinct
subensembles, might be solved. However, there is a different solution, viz., the
one advocated by Einstein, considering all ensembles, both pure states as well as
mixtures, as inhomogeneous. Hence, on the basis of the present considerations no
definite answer can be given.
In order to discuss the problem of (in)homogeneity more fully, I will assume that
in a homogeneous ensemble a quantum mechanical measurement produces a random
sequence of measurement results which is homogeneous too. Here ‘homogeneity of
a random sequence’ is taken in the sense of von Mises’ theory of random sequences
[30] according to the definition:
A random sequence is homogeneous if every allowed subsequence has the same rela-
tive frequency as the original sequence (homogeneity of a random sequence).
According to von Mises a subsequence is allowed if its members are selected using an
algorithm that does not depend on the values of the selected members (for instance,
in a random sequence consisting of 0’s and 1’s, the criterion ‘select all 0’s’ is not
allowed). Now the question of whether an ensemble, described by density operator
ρ =
∑
j rj |φj〉〈φj| is inhomogeneous, hinges on the question of whether there exists
an allowed selection procedure to select subensembles described by state vectors
|φj〉 (which subensembles in general yield distinct measurement results if the state
vectors are different for different j). As argued above, von Neumann’s choice to
answer this question affirmatively is less justified than it appear to be at first sight.
By d’Espagnat ([31], chapter 7.2) a distinction has been drawn between proper
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and improper mixtures, described by the same density operator. In the case of
a proper mixture, represented by density operator ρ =
∑
j rj|φj〉〈φj|, an allowed
selection procedure exists, viz. selection on the basis of the parameter setting j
of the preparation apparatus corresponding to the preparation of the subensemble
described by |φj〉. This selection procedure is allowed because the parameter setting
j determines the state |φj〉 rather than the other way around. According to the von
Mises criterion a proper mixture must therefore be inhomogeneous.
When we apply the above reasoning to improper mixtures (obtained from a
pure entangled state by partial tracing) the outcome is less unambiguous. The
question is whether also in the case of an improper mixture an allowed selection
procedure can be found yielding a subsequence with relative frequency differing
from the one obtained from ρ. Using (1) and (2) (taking ρ1 = ρ and φ1j = φj), a
selection procedure could be contemplated on the basis of the existence of a polar
decomposition (Schmidt [32]), to the effect that any two-particle state |ψ12〉 can be
written according to
|ψ12〉 =
∑
i
ci|α
(s)
1i 〉|β
(s)
2i 〉, (3)
where {|α
(s)
1i 〉} and {|β
(s)
2i 〉} are special orthonormal sets of eigenvectors of observ-
ables of particles 1 and 2, respectively, determined by the state vector |ψ12〉 (these
vectors turn out to be the eigenvectors of the reduced density operators ρ1 and ρ2,
obtained from |ψ12〉〈ψ12| by partial tracing). Hence, for any (improper) mixture
there exist two observables, A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 (having the vectors |α
(s)
1i 〉 and |β
(s)
2i 〉 as
eigenvectors, respectively) which are strictly correlated according to (3). Now a
measurement of B
(s)
2 on particle 2 might seem to yield an allowed selection proce-
dure for selecting subensembles of particle 1 described by the vectors |α
(s)
1i 〉. Since
the relative frequencies of a measurement performed on particle 1 will in general be
different for different values of i, the ensemble corresponding to ρ = ρ1 (in which
the measurement results for particle 2 are ignored) would then be inhomogeneous.
However, as will be seen next, there is a catch to this argument.
Another way to look at this problem is by not only considering a measurement
of observable B
(s)
2 on particle 2 but also a simultaneously performed measurement
of observable A
(s)
1 on particle 1, yielding two (correlated) sequences of measurement
results. Due to the correlation, subsequences of measurement results of particle 1 can
be selected, conditional on certain measurement results of particle 2. Once again,
the question is whether this selection procedure is an allowed one. The answer to this
question hinges on the (in)dependence of the value of observable B
(s)
2 (constituting
the criterion of selection) with respect to the value of observable A
(s)
1 .
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In general, measurements performed on two different particles can be considered
to be independent. This suggests that the selection procedure is an allowed one.
However, we do not have a general situation here. With respect to the measured
observables state vector (3) is a very special one, warranting a strict correlation
between the measurement results of the two particles. The selection procedure
makes an essential use of this strict correlation, even to the effect that occasionally
a measurement on one particle is interpreted as a measurement of the correlated
observable of the other particle (compare the EPR experiment to be discussed in
section 5). If this is taken into account, the selection procedure does not seem to
be allowed any more, because in this experiment selection of a measurement result
of particle 2 is equivalent to selection of the corresponding measurement result of
particle 1, thus making the selection procedure depend on the value of the selected
measurement result. On this basis homogeneity of improper mixtures could be
thought to be maintainable.
However, this conclusion is changed if we take into account the possibility of
measuring, in coincidence with B
(s)
2 , an observable A
′
1 of particle 1 differing from
A
(s)
1 . In general, in the state (3) observables A
′
1 and B
(s)
2 are not strictly correlated,
and their measurement results can be considered as independently obtained. This
implies that, according to von Mises’ definition, the ensemble represented by (2)
can be considered as inhomogeneous. Homogeneity of mixtures (either proper or
improper) seems to be maintainable only if the experimental possibility to split
quantum mechanical ensembles into distinct subensembles is ignored. We will see in
the following that this issue is closely related to the Copenhagen negligence of the
difference between the notions of ‘preparation’ and ‘measurement’, causing a strong
focussing on measurement of the special observables A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 if the state is given
by (3), and entailing a virtual absence of any discussion of measurement of other
observables. This neglect has played a very confusing role in the discussions following
the EPR proposal. Occasional references to a broader point of view, like the one
by Hooker ([33], section 5), to the effect that consideration of a joint measurement
of position of particle 1 and momentum of particle 2 might provide an argument to
be used in the EPR challenge of the Copenhagen interpretation, remained largely
unnoticed.
5 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment [9] can be considered as an ultimate at-
tempt from Einstein’s part to prove ‘incompleteness of quantum mechanics’, in the
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sense that quantum mechanics is not capable to account for the sharp values of
both position and momentum that allegedly can be simultaneously attributed to
a microscopic object. Earlier attempts had been defeated by Bohr by pointing to
the disturbing influence of measurement, making such a simultaneous attribution
impossible. Therefore the EPR proposal was devised so as to make it possible to
obtain knowledge about a particle “without in any way disturbing the system.” In
the experiment a two-particle system is considered, described by an entangled state
of the type (3), the two particles being prepared so as to be so far apart that a
measurement on particle 1 does not influence particle 2. Due to the correlation
between observables A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 expressed by (3), it is possible according to EPR
to infer the value of the quantum mechanical observable B
(s)
2 of particle 2 from the
measurement result obtained by measuring observable A
(s)
1 on particle 1. In this way
information on particle 2 is obtained without in any way disturbing this particle.
A conclusion of ‘incompleteness of quantum mechanics’ is drawn by EPR for the
special situation in which the expansion (3) of state vector |ψ12〉 is not unique, in
the sense that orthonormal sets {|α′1i〉} and {|β
′
2i〉} of eigenvectors of observables A
′
1
and B′2, respectively, exist such that |ψ12〉 can be also expressed according to
|ψ12〉 =
∑
i
c′i|α
′
1i〉|β
′
2i〉.
The crucial point of the EPR reasoning is that observable A′1 is incompatible with
A
(s)
1 (and analogously for observables B
(s)
2 and B
′
2 of particle 2). Because particle
2 cannot experience which of the two observables is measured on particle 1, it is
concluded by EPR that values of the incompatible observables B
(s)
2 and B
′
2 can
be simultaneously attributed to particle 2. ‘Incompleteness of quantum mechanics’
follows from the circumstance that quantum mechanics is not able to describe a
state of particle 2 in which both of these observables have sharp values.
It is important to note here that in reaching this conclusion EPR in an essential
way make use of an objectivistic-realist interpretation of the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics, since they assume quantum mechanical measurement results
to correspond to objective properties of the microscopic object (‘elements of physical
reality’). It is precisely on this count that Bohr [10] challenged the EPR conclusion
of incompleteness. According to Bohr’s correspondence principle, to be discussed in
section 6, quantum mechanical measurement results have a contextual meaning that
is determined only by taking into account the ‘whole experimental arrangement’,
including the measurement arrangement for particle 1. The actual presence of this
arrangement is essential for obtaining knowledge on particle 2. According to Bohr,
Einstein’s definition of elements of physical reality of particle 2 is ambiguous because
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it does not take into account the experimental arrangement of particle 1. Bohr
thought that if this is corrected the EPR challenge could be dealt with in precisely
the same way earlier attempts by Einstein to prove incompleteness of quantum
mechanics were countered.
However, Bohr’s above-mentioned judgment is not completely reliable (e.g. Pop-
per ([34], p. 149), Jammer ([35], p. 194), also Folse [4]). Admittedly, the issue of
‘contextuality’ is used by him also here, but not in the interactional sense involved in
the ‘quantum postulate’. Bohr’s answer to EPR implies a change of interpretation,
to the effect that for defining a physical quantity of particle 2 it is sufficient that
a relation exist between particle 2 and the measuring instrument (which interacts
only with particle 1). It is no longer deemed necessary that this relation (which was
compared to a coordinate system by Bohr) be realized by an interaction, like it was
before.
This change of interpretation from an interactional to a relational point of view
has had a large impact on later developments, because it introduced into the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics an issue of ‘nonlocality’ which since that time
has stayed with us. It was contended by Einstein that this nonlocality is just an
artefact of Bohr’s interpretation, combining contextuality of observables with an
individual-particle interpretation of the state vector (i.e. completeness). According
to him objectivity of observables could be restored by assuming an ensemble inter-
pretation of the state vector (i.e. incompleteness): such an interpretation would
allow to avoid the Copenhagen indeterminism (implying that a value of a quantum
mechanical observable cannot be attributed to the object as a property possessed
prior to measurement), and to interpret von Neumann projection, applied to particle
2 on the basis of a measurement on particle 1, as a selection of a subensemble. Un-
fortunately, in 1935 no Kochen-Specker or Bell theorems were available to put this
into doubt. Nowadays we are convinced by these theorems that it is not possible
to attribute values of all quantum mechanical observables as objective properties
to the object, possessed independently of measurement, and that, therefore, Ein-
stein’s ensemble interpretation cannot be the final solution (e.g. Guy and Deltete
[36]). This does not imply, however, that Bohr’s nonlocal contextuality must be
accepted. Its general acceptance is based on a number of confusions and inconsis-
tencies which have entered the Copenhagen interpretation, to be discussed in the
following sections.
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6 Correspondence and complementarity
According to Petersen [37], the correspondence principle is characteristic of the
“Copenhagen spirit of quantum theory.” The idea of ‘correspondence’ is an expres-
sion of the necessity felt to maintain as much as possible the use of classical concepts
within the atomic domain. It is necessary to distinguish a weak and a strong form
of the correspondence principle. In its weak form (e.g. Messiah [38], section 1.12)
it is a requirement that the laws of microscopic physics must be formulated in such
a way that in the limit of large quantum numbers (the ‘classical limit’) quantum
mechanical results must agree with the results of classical mechanics. In its strong
form the correspondence principle is valid not only in an asymptotic sense, but it
is a requirement to be met by any measurement within the microscopic domain,
independently of the values of the quantum numbers.
By the strong form of the correspondence principle the necessity is expressed
of basing the description of the properties and manipulation of the measuring in-
struments on purely classical ideas, which are the ideas of macrophysics, thought to
be the only means of unambiguous communication. According to Bohr a quantum
phenomenon can be communicated only by using the classical terms by which the
measurement arrangement is characterized. The measurement arrangement plays a
key role in defining a quantum mechanical observable.
A quantum mechanical observable is exclusively defined by and within the context
of the measurement serving to measure that observable; experimental arrangement
and measurement results are to be described in classical terms (strong form of the
correspondence principle).
Note that according to Bohr this does not mean that a quantum mechanical mea-
surement process could not be described quantum mechanically. However, such a
description would not be able to account for the macroscopic behavior of the measur-
ing instruments, and, for this reason, would no longer allow to consider the process
as a measurement process.
The idea of ‘complementarity’ is just an extension of the idea of ‘correspondence’.
If the definition of a quantum mechanical observable is restricted by its measurement
arrangement, then mutual exclusiveness of measurement arrangements can explain
why incompatible observables cannot simultaneously have sharp values. Thus,
Incompatible quantum mechanical observables correspond to mutually exclusive mea-
surement arrangements, defining different aspects of reality which cannot be united
in a single classical picture (complementarity).
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Bohr and Heisenberg applied the idea of ‘complementarity’ in the first place to
position and momentum observables, which, due to complementarity, cannot be
defined more accurately than is allowed by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations
∆Q∆P ≥ ~/2, (∆Q)2 = 〈Ψ|(Q− 〈Q〉)2|Ψ〉, (∆P )2 = 〈Ψ|(P − 〈P 〉)2|Ψ〉, (4)
thus allegedly implementing the idea of ‘completeness in a restricted sense’ in the
quantum mechanical formalism as a consequence of incompatibility of the corre-
sponding operators: [Q,P ]− = i~. By Heisenberg this was interpreted as a conse-
quence of mutual disturbance in a simultaneous measurement of position and mo-
mentum, caused by mutual exclusiveness of the measurement arrangements serving
to measure each of these observables separately in an ideal way.
It should be noticed that the interpretations of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s are
rather different from each other. By Heisenberg the quantities ∆Q and ∆P are
interpreted as measures of the measurement accuracies of simultaneously performed
measurements of position and momentum, respectively. Heisenberg ([39], section
II.2) explicitly noted that inequality (4) must be seen as a property of the micro-
scopic object, valid in its post-measurement state, and, therefore, to be seen as an
objective property of the microscopic object after it has ceased to interact with the
measuring instrument. For Bohr the inequality marks a limitation of our possibility
to apply to a microscopic object the classical notions of position and momentum
(latitudes of definition) during a simultaneous measurement of these quantities. Of
course, if every initial state were prepared by a simultaneous measurement of position
and momentum, the difference between Bohr and Heisenberg would be inconsequen-
tial. However, although all measurements are also preparations, the converse is not
very plausible. Equating arbitrary preparations realized in nature with measure-
ments would stretch the definition of ‘measurement’ rather too much. The seeming
agreement on the meaning attributed by Bohr and Heisenberg to the Heisenberg
uncertainty relations, marks the fundamental failure of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion to distinguish ‘preparation’ and ‘measurement’ (cf. section 8). It was realized
only a very long time after the inception of the idea of ‘complementarity’ (Ballen-
tine [40]) that it is inconsistent to interpret (4) -which is a property of the initial
(pre-measurement) state |Ψ〉- as referring to a subsequent measurement.
Although presumably not completely justified, the correspondence principle has
often been considered as demonstrating an inclination of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation towards positivism/empiricism. Indeed, the insight that an account of a
quantum mechanical measurement must be based on a so-called ‘observation lan-
guage’, or, at least, on an independently tested theory (viz. classical mechanics),
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was consistent with the logical positivist/empiricist ideas. We should be cautious
with such a conclusion, however. Empiricism does not seem to be involved in Bohr’s
characterization of the quantum phenomenon by ‘the experiment as a whole’, sup-
posed to refer to observations obtained under specific circumstances including an
account of the whole experimental arrangement. Nor does the Copenhagen usage
of interpreting measurement results as (classical) properties of the microscopic ob-
ject rather than as pointer readings of a (macroscopic) measuring instrument point
into the direction of empiricism. Above all, the non-vanishing value of the ‘quan-
tum of action’ is the characterizing feature stressed by Bohr, making it impossible
to draw a sharp distinction between microscopic object and measuring instrument.
Heisenberg ([41], p. 145), while distinguishing between the reality of the positivistic
sense impressions of an observer and the reality of objects and events dealt with in
atomic physics, even explicitly denies that the Copenhagen interpretation would be
a positivistic one (see also section 11).
Nowadays the reliance of the correspondence principle on a classical description
of measurement is recognized as a severe drawback. It has been realized that it
is impossible to describe information transfer from a microscopic object to a mea-
suring instrument by means of classical mechanics alone. Admittedly, a measuring
instrument for measuring a quantum mechanical observable must have a macro-
scopic pointer, to be described classically as far as its macroscopic properties are
concerned. But it is equally important that a measuring instrument have also a
microscopic component which is sensitive to the microscopic information that in
the measurement process is transferred to it from the microscopic object. Actually,
quantum mechanics presents a clear paradigm of the ‘theory-ladenness of observa-
tion’, which during the second half of the 20th century caused the decline of logical
positivist/empiricist influence. A growing awareness of the necessity to consider a
physical theory not as universally valid, but only as valid on a certain domain of
application, has stimulated the view that application of classical notions to micro-
scopic processes may not be such a good idea in general. The information transfer
between the microscopic object and the sensitive part of the measuring instrument is
a microscopic process, well within the domain of application of quantum mechanics.
It should be noted that the ban on a quantum mechanical description of mea-
surement, imposed by the correspondence principle, has been disregarded e.g. by
von Neumann and by Heisenberg. However, the quantum mechanical treatments
by von Neumann and Heisenberg probably had the intention to justify the idea of
‘correspondence’ by means of quantum mechanical considerations, rather than to be
independent attempts at a quantum mechanical account of measurement. As will
be reviewed in section 10, a genuine application of quantum mechanics to quantum
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mechanical measurement is indispensable for an assessment of the role played by
measurement in quantum mechanics. In particular, it follows that a generalization
of the mathematical formalism is necessary in order to be able to describe even
experiments that -like the two-slit experiment- were crucial in developing the idea
of ‘complementarity’. Also, von Neumann’s projection postulate turns out to be
obsolete as a measurement principle securing a well-defined value of an observable
as a result of a measurement. It seems that the urge to interpret such a result as a
property of the microscopic object is a consequence of the classical thinking involved
in the correspondence principle.
The correspondence principle is consistent with the idea that a quantum me-
chanical observable does not have a value prior to its measurement. The contextual
meaning of a quantum mechanical observable is justified by the essential role played
by the measurement arrangement in its definition (cf. section 2.2). It seems that
theorems like the Kochen-Specker and Bell theorems corroborate this idea. There-
fore, in our attempt to develop a neo-Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum
mechanical formalism this feature will be maintained: quantum mechanical observ-
ables are associated with the measurement arrangements set up to realize their
measurement. Actually, since this feature is perhaps the prime characteristic of the
Copenhagen interpretation, this is a reason to refer to the new interpretation as a
neo-Copenhagen one, even though the latter will differ from it in many respects.
In particular, I will take seriously the empiricist connotation of the correspondence
principle mentioned above, by associating quantum mechanical observables with
properties of the measuring instrument rather than with (contextual) properties of
the microscopic object. This makes the essential role of the measurement arrange-
ment in interpreting the quantum mechanical formalism even stronger. By doing
so it will be seen in section 10 that the idea of ‘complementarity’ as a consequence
of mutual disturbance in a joint measurement of incompatible observables need not
be proposed as a separate principle, but that it straightforwardly follows from the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics.
7 EPR and correspondence
There is an important lesson to be learnt from Bohr’s [10] application of the corre-
spondence principle in his answer to the EPR challenge. Actually, this application
does not seem to be in complete agreement with this principle as given above. By
Einstein it was assumed that in the state (3) observables A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 are strictly
correlated so as to allow inference of the value of one observable from the result
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obtained by measuring the other one. It is unfortunate that Bohr did not chal-
lenge this assumption on the basis of a strict application of the strong form of his
correspondence principle. On the basis of this principle Bohr could have rejected
the possibility of defining the correlation of observables A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 outside the
measurement context for measuring it. A strict application of the correspondence
principle (strong form) would have implied the requirement that measurements be
performed on both particles, thus making obsolete the EPR idea of applying the
notion of an ‘element of physical reality’, and, consequently, blocking the whole
EPR reasoning. By taking into account that a definition of the correlation would
imply that each of the particles is interacting with its own measuring instrument,
Bohr could have maintained his contextualistic-realist interpretation in the interac-
tionist sense originally intended, without any need to recede to a relational point
of view (cf. section 5). Moreover, there would not have been any reason to resort
to nonlocality in order to implement the contextuality going with the “nonlocal”
measurement arrangement, since each particle’s context can be locally determined
by the measuring instrument the particle is interacting with.
However, Bohr did not challenge EPR in this way. Evidently, he did not recognize
the correlation of observables A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 as an ordinary observable, to be measured
by means of coincidence measurements like the EPR-Bell ones performed e.g. by
Aspect et al. [42, 43]. Instead, he followed EPR in taking for granted existence of
the correlation of the observables already if only one of the observables is measured.
Consequently, in order to apply his correspondence principle Bohr had to refer to the
context furnished for particle 2 by the measurement arrangement of particle 1, thus
starting the nonlocality enigma. On a consistent application of the correspondence
principle we would not have had any reason to infer any nonlocality if measurements
of the EPR-Bell type are considered rather than experiments of the EPR type.
Of course, this does not imply that such an inference of nonlocality could not be
drawn in a different way from the EPR experiment as it was actually proposed. As
already remarked in section 5, it is not possible to accept EPR’s proposal to solve
all problems by means of an ensemble interpretation of the state vector. In order to
analyze this, it is necessary, however, to discuss another confusion inherent in the
Copenhagen interpretation, viz. the confusion of the notions of ‘preparation’ and
‘measurement’, which also Bohr has seemingly fallen prey to in analyzing the EPR
proposal, by accepting it as a measurement of an observable of particle 2 rather than
as a preparation applied to this particle.
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8 Preparation and measurement
Since Bohr was ready to apply his correspondence principle (strong form) to the EPR
experiment, he evidently accepted it as a measurement of a property of particle 2,
in the way intended by EPR. It is questionable, however, whether this is justified.
Admittedly, on the basis of the existence of the strict correlation between observables
A
(s)
1 and B
(s)
2 , as suggested by (3), the measurement result of observable B
(s)
2 , to
be obtained if it were actually carried out in coincidence with the measurement of
A
(s)
1 , could be inferred already from the result of the measurement of the particle
1 observable. However, this inference is possible only if the correlation is assumed
to exist independently of its measurement. Only on this basis can the measurement
of particle 1 be interpreted as a measurement of the correlated property of particle
2. To the extent the strong form of the correspondence principle is an essential
ingredient of the Copenhagen interpretation, this entails an internal inconsistency
of this interpretation if it accepts the EPR experiment as a measurement of particle
2.
In order to remove this inconsistency, it is necessary to duly distinguish between
the EPR experiment and EPR-Bell experiments like the ones performed by Aspect et
al., in the sense that in the former there is no measurement carried out on particle
2. Instead, by the EPR procedure this latter particle (better: the corresponding
ensemble) is prepared in a certain state, conditional on a measurement result yielded
by the measurement of particle 1. Not distinguishing between the processes of
‘measurement’ and ‘conditional preparation’ has caused quite a bit of confusion. For
instance, in an EPR-Bell experiment it would be possible to measure in coincidence
with A
(s)
1 an observable B
′
2 of particle 2, incompatible with the special observable
B
(s)
2 . If the measurement of A
(s)
1 were still to be interpreted as a measurement of
B
(s)
2 , this would imply a simultaneous measurement of two incompatible observables
of particle 2, which is in disagreement with another assumption of the Copenhagen
interpretation, viz. the complementarity principle. As this latter principle is a
cornerstone of the Copenhagen interpretation which is to survive (cf. section 10), it
seems wise to prevent such a disagreement by duly distinguishing EPR experiments
from EPR-Bell ones.
Unfortunately, the confusion of the notions of ‘preparation’ and ‘measurement’,
observed here, is a general feature of the Copenhagen interpretation, induced by the
impossibility of attributing an objective value of a quantum mechanical observable
to the microscopic object, possessed prior to measurement. As a consequence, a
measurement cannot reveal a pre-existing value of an observable, as is generally
thought to be the case in classical mechanics. As a second best solution to this
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problem it was assumed that, at least, the value of the observable may be attributed
to the object immediately after the measurement. This, actually, is the origin of von
Neumann’s projection postulate, intending the measurement to prepare the object in
an eigenstate of the measured observable. Application of this postulate to the EPR
experiment, considered as a measurement of observable B
(s)
2 , has been responsible for
the idea that the particle 2 state is projected onto one of the eigenstates |β
(s)
2i 〉. This
idea has already been criticized by Margenau [44] on the basis that von Neumann’s
projection postulate is necessary only in an individual-particle interpretation of the
wave function, and would be meaningless in an ensemble interpretation because a
measurement on an individual particle cannot change the state of a whole ensemble.
Notwithstanding Margenau’s criticism, the idea of a quantum mechanical mea-
surement as preparing the microscopic object in one of a number of macroscopically
distinguishable states, thus allowing to obtain a measurement result by ascertaining
‘in which of these states the object finally is’ (like, for instance, the Stern-Gerlach ex-
periment), has become more or less paradigmatic of the Copenhagen interpretation.
For instance, in his axiomatization of quantum mechanics, Jauch ([45], section 11-3)
considers a measurement as a filter, leaving the object in one of the eigenstates of
the measured observable (so-called measurements of the first kind). By now it is
well known, however, that the large majority of measurement procedures employed
in actual practice does not satisfy this model. In general, it is not the microscopic
object itself, but rather the pointer of a measuring instrument that is brought into
one of a set of macroscopically distinguishable states. The microscopic object may
even be annihilated in the measurement process (like, for instance, photons detected
by an ideal photon counter). Conditional on the final pointer state the object is left
behind in some state determined by the interaction of object and measuring instru-
ment, in general differing from an eigenvector of the measured observable. For this
reason it is hardly appropriate to consider von Neumann’s projection postulate as
a measurement principle, generally valid in quantum mechanical measurement.
However, this reasoning does not apply to EPR, because this experiment is not
a measurement of particle 2. It is precisely due to this fact that von Neumann’s pro-
jection postulate can be applied to EPR. Indeed, this postulate is a valid preparation
principle, routinely applied in the laboratory for preparing microscopic objects in
well-defined quantum mechanical states. Thus, if in the two-particle state (3) a
measurement of an arbitrary observable F2 of particle 2 is carried out, conditional
on measurement result a1i of the jointly measured observable A
(s)
1 , then the condi-
tional probability p(f2j |a1i) of measurement result f2j of F2 can be derived from the
joint probability
p(a1i, f2j) = |〈ψ12|α
(s)
1i φ2j〉|
2 (5)
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(|φ2j〉 the eigenvector of F2 corresponding to eigenvalue f2j), according to
p(f2j|a1i) =
p(a1i, f2j)
p(a1i)
. (6)
Putting
p(f2j |a1i) = 〈φ2j |ρ2i|φ2j〉, (7)
it is straightforwardly proven that the density operator ρ2i of the particle 2 state
satisfying (7) is given by |β
(s)
2i 〉〈β
(s)
2i |. Hence, the subensemble of particles 2 prepared
by selecting these particles on the basis of measurement result a1i of observable A
(s)
1
of particle 1 from an ensemble of particle pairs prepared in state (3), is described by
the state vector |β
(s)
2i 〉 postulated by von Neumann’s projection postulate. Evidently,
as a principle of conditional preparation this postulate has a certain legitimacy. It
should be stressed that this legitimacy derives from the fact that the final state
of the preparation process of particle 2 is not influenced by any interaction with a
measuring instrument.
Measurements of the EPR type are sometimes called ‘predictive measurements’
(e.g. Kemble ([46]) to distinguish them from ‘determinative measurements’ yielding
only information about probabilities of the initial state, without telling anything
about the post-measurement state of the microscopic object. In the former it is
precisely this latter state that is the important issue, in the sense that we have here
a method to prepare, conditional on the measurement result, the microscopic object
in a well-defined state (like |β
(s)
2i 〉 in the EPR procedure). Here the preparation is
the crucial issue: in the post-measurement state a (subsequent) measurement of an
arbitrary observable F2 can be performed. The EPR experiment is a (conditional)
preparation of particle 2. Its interpretation as a measurement of an observable of this
latter particle has caused much confusion. In particular, it seduced Bohr to apply his
correspondence principle (strong form), even though it is a measurement principle
rather than a preparation principle. Evidently, Bohr did not consider the observable
A
(s)
1 ⊗ B
(s)
2 , corresponding to a measurement of the correlation of the observables
of particles 1 and 2, as an ordinary quantum mechanical observable, to be well-
defined only within the context of the experimental arrangement for measuring it.
By interpreting the conditional preparation of particle 2 as a measurement he went
even so far as to assume that the correlation between the particles is determined by
the measurement arrangement for only one of the particles (as well as, of course,
by the preparing apparatus). The nonlocal contextuality ensuing from this must be
seen as a consequence of an inconsistent application of the correspondence principle
(strong form).
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9 Conditional preparation versus contextual state
The fundamental confusion of preparation and measurement, involved in the Copen-
hagen interpretation, can be highlighted in yet another way. For this purpose let us
define for a system, prepared with state ρ, and on which a measurement is performed
of standard observable A =
∑
m amPm, the contextual state
ρA =
∑
m
PmρPm. (8)
It is usual to consider this state as the final state of a von Neumann-Lu¨ders measure-
ment procedure, for which, in agreement with Heisenberg’s ideas discussed above,
the equality TrρAPm = TrρPm allows to infer the probabilities of the initial state
from those measured in the final one. However, in view of the inapplicability of
the notion of ‘measurement of the first kind’, this interpretation does not seem to
be very useful. Bohr’s correspondence principle (strong form) offers a way to look
upon the state ρA (8) in a different way, viz. as an alternative description of the
initial state of an object, prepared according to ρ, as soon as it is within the context
of the measurement arrangement for measuring observable A. Note that, due to
Bohr’s instrumentalist conception of quantum mechanical state vectors, presumably
this interpretation is far from Bohrian. But it would at least yield another ontolog-
ical implementation of Bohr’s idea that observable A is well-defined only within the
context of a measurement of this observable, consistent with Bohr’s correspondence
view of observables discussed in section 6. It would allow within quantum mechanics
to distinguish between the state of an object as it is prepared prior to its interaction
with a measuring instrument, and the state probed by this measuring instrument,
possibly already influenced by that instrument. This is quite analogous to the way
a classical rigid body model of a billiard ball accounts for certain observations, thus
accounting for rigidity as a property of a billiard ball only to be attributed within a
particular experimental context (cf. section 2.2; see section 12 for another analogy).
The contextual state should be distinguished from the conditionally prepared
states of a measurement procedure. The distinction between a contextual state and
a conditionally prepared state is particularly telling in the EPR experiment. As
demonstrated in section 8, in a measurement of the particle 1 observable A
(s)
1 in
the two-particle state (3), particle 2 is conditionally prepared in the state |β
(s)
2i 〉. In
the Copenhagen interpretation this is often interpreted in the sense that the corre-
sponding value of observable B
(s)
2 has got a definite value due to the measurement
on particle 1. In Bohr’s correspondence view of the EPR experiment it is even as-
sumed that this value must be well-defined as soon as particle 1 is interacting with
its measuring instrument, thus starting the nonlocality enigma.
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Now the question can be asked: does the state vector |β
(s)
2i 〉 “really” describe
the reality of particle 2 as it is in the context of a measurement of an observable of
particle 1? The problem is that we cannot tell. In order to probe this reality we
have to make a measurement on particle 2 of some observable F2 =
∑
j f2j |φ2j〉〈φ2j|.
In the context of this measurement the contextual state is given by
|β
(s)
2i 〉〈β
(s)
2i |F2 =
∑
j
|〈β
(s)
2i |φ2j〉|
2|φ2j〉〈φ2j|.
This state is very different from |β
(s)
2i 〉〈β
(s)
2i |. Since these states yield the same mea-
surement results for F2, it is impossible to tell which is the “real” one. Whether
before the measurement the state “really” was |β
(s)
2i 〉〈β
(s)
2i | is a matter of interpre-
tation. This will be discussed more extensively in section 11, where a different
interpretation will be proposed.
More generally, for the two-particle system involved in an EPR-Bell measure-
ment in which an arbitrary correlation observable A1 ⊗ B2 =
∑
i a1i|α1i〉〈α1i| ⊗∑
j b2j |β2j〉〈β2j | is measured in an arbitrary state |ψ12〉, the contextual state (8) is
given by
|ψ12〉〈ψ12|A1⊗B2 =
∑
ij
|〈ψ12|α1iβ2j〉|
2|α1iβ2j〉〈α1iβ2j |.
From this expression the contextual states of the two particles separately can be
derived by partial tracing as the contextual states to be found for each particle,
independently of which measurement is carried out on the other particle. This
illustrates the possibility of local contexts referred to in section 6. Contrary to what
is often supposed, the conditionally prepared state need not play any prominent role
in describing the reality of particle 2 if a measurement is carried out on this particle,
because in that case this reality is locally (co-)determined by the measurement
arrangement that is actually present at the location of this particle.
10 Generalized observables, and complementar-
ity
As already noted in section 6, the Copenhagen confusion of the notions of ‘prepara-
tion’ and ‘measurement’ has had an equally confusing effect with respect to the issue
of ‘complementarity’. By Heisenberg ‘mutual disturbance in a joint measurement of
incompatible observables’ was taken in a preparative sense, in which ‘disturbance’
is referring to the preparation of the final state of the object. There is another
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possibility, however, to the effect that ‘disturbance’ may refer to the final state of
the measuring instrument, in the sense that the probability distribution of the final
pointer positions may depend on the details of the measurement procedure, and,
hence, may change if the measurement arrangement is changed so as to also yield
information on an observable incompatible with the measured one. Then ‘measure-
ment disturbance’ may refer to a deviation of such a probability distribution from
the “ideal” one obtained in a measurement procedure reproducing the probability
distribution predicted by the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. This will
be referred to as ‘mutual disturbance in a determinative sense’. Due to a restric-
tion of the attention to measurements of the Heisenberg type in which measurement
results are associated with final states of the microscopic object, the distinction be-
tween the preparative and determinative types of disturbance has remained largely
unnoticed.
This subject has been more fully discussed elsewhere [47, 12], and will be re-
viewed here only briefly, even though it is of primary importance for understanding
the ways in which the Copenhagen interpretation has been confused. It is important
to note here that a major cause of this confusion was the fact that at the time Bohr
and Heisenberg developed the complementarity principle the quantum mechanical
formalism had not been fully developed. Conclusions with respect to uncertain-
ties were often drawn from the classical reasoning advocated by the correspondence
principle. As far as measurement was described quantum mechanically at all, this
description seems to have served mainly to justify the idea of ‘correspondence’ (in
particular, by means of von Neumann projection). Only after the quantum me-
chanical character of measurement in the atomic domain has been taken seriously,
it has become possible to straighten out the above-mentioned confusion involved in
the notion of ‘complementarity’. It turns out that complementarity in the sense of
‘mutual disturbance in a joint measurement of incompatible observables’ need not
be seen as a consequence of limitations of the classical reasoning involved in the
correspondence principle, but that, if ‘mutual disturbance’ is taken in the determi-
native sense defined above, it can be derived from the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics.
It had to be realized first, however, that the standard representation of a quan-
tum mechanical observable as a Hermitian operator is too restricted a concept to
encompass all possible measurements in the atomic domain (in particular, joint
measurement of incompatible observables). This follows straightforwardly from a
quantum mechanical treatment of the interaction of a microscopic object and a
measuring instrument, by applying the usual measurement postulates to the mea-
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suring instrument. We find the quantum mechanical probabilities according to
pm = TroρMm, Mm = TraρaU
†E(a)m U, (9)
in which ρa is the initial state of the measuring instrument, U is the unitary evolution
operator of the interaction process, and E
(a)
m are operators of the measuring instru-
ment a determining the detection probabilities pm of the measurement as their final
state expectation values. Compared to the standard formalism of textbook quantum
mechanics the generalization consists of the fact that nothing requires the operators
Mm to be projection operators. In general, the quantum mechanical measurement
results (detection probabilities) are represented according to (9) by the expectation
values of a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) {Mm} taken in the initial
state ρ of the microscopic object. It can be verified that the two-slit experiment
-consideration of which has contributed in an essential way to the development of
the notion of ‘complementarity’- is not representable by a Hermitian operator (com-
pare de Muynck [12], section 7.3). It is not surprising that much confusion has been
generated by drawing general conclusions from a too restricted mathematical for-
malism, viz. the standard formalism restricting to the projection-valued measures
(PVMs) corresponding to the spectral representations of Hermitian (better: self-
adjoint) operators. In particular it has led to unjustifiedly interpreting inequality
(4) as a consequence of mutual disturbance in a joint measurement of position and
momentum, rather than as a representation of our restricted ability to prepare initial
states (cf. Ballentine [40]).
As demonstrated by Martens and de Muynck [48], the inapplicability of the
Heisenberg inequality (4) to mutual disturbance in a joint measurement of incom-
patible observables does not imply that this latter feature of quantum mechanical
measurement is not a perfectly real one. As a matter of fact, this feature has been
demonstrated to exist in a number of ‘thought experiments’ widely discussed during
the days of the inception of the idea of ‘complementarity’. However, for its theo-
retical description it needs the generalization of the standard formalism referred to
above. Whereas it is not at all clear how a joint measurement of incompatible stan-
dard observables could be described by the standard formalism, it is easy to define a
joint measurement of incompatible observables (POVMs) {Pm} and {Qn} by requir-
ing that a bivariate POVM {Rmn} exist, of which {Pm} and {Qn} are marginals,
such that the expectation value TrρRmn can be interpreted as the joint probabil-
ity distribution of the latter observables. It is easy to find examples satisfying this
requirement. In agreement with the standard formalism, this is impossible if {Pm}
and {Qn} are projection-valued measures of standard observables, represented by
the corresponding Hermitian operators.
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More generally, it is possible to define a joint nonideal measurement of incom-
patible POVMs {Pm} and {Qn} by requiring a bivariate POVM {R
′
mn} to exist,
such that ∑
nR
′
mn =
∑
m′ λmm′Pm′ , λmm′ ≥ 0,
∑
m λmm′ = 1,∑
mR
′
mn =
∑
n′ µnn′Qn′, µnn′ ≥ 0,
∑
n µnn′ = 1.
(10)
Here matrices (λmm′) and (µnn′) are so-called nonideality matrices, defining the
nonideality of the determination of probabilities of observables {Pm} and {Qn},
respectively, if POVM {R′mn} is measured. It should be noted that {Pm} and {Qn}
may be PVMs here.
As measures of nonideality of the nonideality matrices (λmm′) and (µnn′) it is
useful to take the average row entropies (restricting to finite dimension N)
J(λ) = −
1
N
∑
mm′
λmm′ ln
λmm′∑
m′′ λmm′′
(11)
(and analogously for (µnn′)). If {Pm} and {Qn} are PVMs, it is possible [48] to
derive for the nonideality measures J(λ) and J(µ) the Martens inequality
J(λ) + J(µ) ≥ − ln{max
mn
TrPmQn}. (12)
Note that the right hand side of inequality (12) vanishes if {Pm} and {Qn} are
compatible PVMs.
It should be stressed that the meaning of the Martens inequality is completely dif-
ferent from that of the Heisenberg inequality (4). In contrast to the latter inequality,
the Martens inequality (12) is derived from the properties of the observables alone.
It is a property of the POVM {R′mn}, which is independent of the initial state. The
inequality is in an unambiguous way expressing the notion of ‘mutual disturbance
of measurement results in a joint measurement of incompatible observables’, to the
effect that the quantities J(λ) and J(µ) can be seen as measures of the inaccuracies of
the measurements of the observables {Pm} and {Qn}, respectively, caused by a mu-
tual disturbance of these observables by the measurement process. In contrast to the
Heisenberg inequality the Martens inequality is a perfect mathematical representa-
tion of the idea of ‘complementarity’ as illustrated by the ‘thought experiments’ (like
the two-slit experiment and Heisenberg’s γ-microscope). That this role was initially
attributed to the Heisenberg inequality must be seen as an instance of ‘jumping to
conclusions’, in the sense that the availability of the Heisenberg inequality seemed
to corroborate so perfectly the idea of ‘complementarity’ as defined above that it
clouded most physicists critical senses. Apart from a few critics like Einstein and
Margenau, it had to wait for Ballentine’s 1970 paper for an in-depth analysis of the
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inappropriateness of this attribution, by demonstrating that the Heisenberg inequal-
ity (4) is not a property of a ‘simultaneous or joint measurement of incompatible
observables’ but rather a property of ‘preparation’ (i.e. of the initial state |Ψ〉).
That the confusion could last so long, has several causes. First of all, the Martens
inequality (12) needs the generalized formalism for its derivation. This formalism
was not available then. Moreover, the idea of ‘completeness in a wider sense’, ap-
plied to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, may have been responsible
for the acceptance of the Heisenberg inequality as the only candidate for represent-
ing so obvious a physical phenomenon as ‘measurement inaccuracy due to mutual
disturbance’. Only after the generalized formalism had been developed it was pos-
sible to break away from this paradigm by deriving from the generalized formalism
the Martens inequality (12) as a better candidate for this purpose. In certain of the
‘thought experiments’ (for instance, the two-slit experiment with a moving screen)
the measurement inaccuracy is a consequence of the uncertainties of position and
momentum in the initial state of the screen, expressed by the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation for the initial state of the screen. This makes it understandable that mea-
surement inaccuracy was associated with the Heisenberg inequality. Another reason
may be the confusion of preparation and measurement inherent in a restriction of
the attention to measurements of the first kind, for which it is not implausible to
interpret -as was done by Heisenberg- the standard deviations of the final state as
measures of inaccuracy of measurement results to be attributed to the initial state.
Such confusions could arise because it was thought that no quantum mechanical
analysis of the measurement process could be given (cf. section 6). It must be
stressed that the developments leading to the generalized formalism of quantum
mechanics could take place only on the basis of a rejection of this tenet of the
Copenhagen interpretation. Only on this basis it was possible (de Muynck [47]) to
realize that not one but two complementarity principles exist, one for preparation
(expressed by the Heisenberg inequality), and one for the joint measurement of
incompatible observables (expressed by the Martens inequality), both derivable from
the (generalized) formalism.
11 Realist versus empiricist interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics
An interpretation of a physical theory is a mapping from its mathematical formalism
into the physical world. Roughly speaking there are two different possibilities for
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quantum mechanics, viz. a realist interpretation and an empiricist one. Here the
possibility is ignored of an instrumentalist interpretation, to the effect that no map-
ping into reality is required at all but the theory is considered as ‘an instrument for
generating measurement results’, because in the author’s view this interpretation’s
omission of attributing a well-defined physical meaning to quantum mechanical con-
cepts has been a source of confusion. This holds true in particular with respect
to the notion of a ‘quantum mechanical measurement result’ which, due to instru-
mentalist vagueness, could be taken at will either as a property of the microscopic
object, or as a property of the measuring instrument, or both.
In a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics the mapping is thought to be from
the mathematical formalism into microscopic reality. The mathematical entities of
the theory (state vector |Ψ〉, density operator ρ, standard observable A, and general-
ized observable {Mm}) are thought to represent properties of the microscopic object
(realist interpretation of quantum mechanics).
A realist interpretation is very similar to the way classical mechanics is usually
interpreted. It is the interpretation adopted in virtually all textbooks of quantum
mechanics. Instruments used to prepare the microscopic object in an initial state,
as well as measuring instruments, are not represented in the quantum mechanical
description even if they are physically present.
As discussed already in section 2, we should distinguish objectivistic and contex-
tualistic versions of a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In an objectivistic-
realist interpretation the quantum mechanical description is thought to refer to
objective reality, that is, a reality independent of any observer, including his mea-
suring instruments. In a contextualistic-realist interpretation quantum mechanical
concepts are thought to have a meaning only within a certain physical context (like
the object’s environment, or a measurement arrangement). Presumably as a conse-
quence of an ill-understood classical paradigm, textbook presentations of quantum
mechanics are generally cast into an objectivistic-realist terminology. However, as
demonstrated by the billiard ball analogy discussed in section 2, not even classical
theories do allow an objectivistic-realist interpretation.
In an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics the mapping of |Ψ〉, ρ, A, and
{Mm} is thought to be from the mathematical formalism into the macroscopic re-
ality of instruments or procedures for preparing and measuring microscopic objects
(empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Thus, in an empiricist interpretation a wave function or a density operator is thought
to be a symbolic representation of a preparing apparatus (for instance, a cyclotron
with specified knob settings) or a preparation procedure. A quantum mechanical
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observable (POVM or PVM) is thought to be a label of a measuring instrument (for
instance, a photosensitive device for detecting photons) or a measurement procedure.
Even though the microscopic object is present, in an empiricist interpretation it is
not thought to be represented by the quantum mechanical formalism. The quantum
mechanical formalism is thought to describe ‘just the phenomena’, phenomena being
situated in the macroscopic instruments for preparing and measuring the microscopic
object. The empiricist interpretation as defined above is the weakest interpretation
of quantum mechanics deploying a well-defined mapping of the mathematical for-
malism into reality. It comes closest to the way quantum mechanics is being used
in the actual practice of experimental physics, if the physicist’s tendency to devise
(classical) pictures behind the phenomena is waived. The quantum mechanical for-
malism is thought not to provide any (causal) mechanisms explaining why a certain
measurement result is obtained on a certain individual preparation. In particular,
the formalism is thought to just describe EPR correlations, without expecting quan-
tum mechanics to yield any causal explanation. Note that by itself this does not
imply indeterminism as discussed in section 2.3. Quantum mechanics is thought to
be neutral with respect to this latter issue, simply because the concept of a quantum
mechanical observable does not apply to preparation procedures.
Notwithstanding similarities, an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics should be carefully distinguished from the empiricist view as fostered by the
philosophical doctrine of logical positivism/empiricism, which considers metaphys-
ical anything that is unobservable. In particular, an empiricist interpretation of
quantum mechanics is perfectly consistent with a belief in a “real” existence of mi-
croscopic objects like atoms and electrons (reality behind the phenomena), even if
these are not directly observed, nor described by this theory. Hence, an empiricist
interpretation of quantum mechanics is not to be confused with the anti-realist phi-
losophy referred to in section 2.1. According to an empiricist interpretation quantum
mechanics does not describe the microscopic objects themselves, but just relations
between preparing and measuring procedures, mediated by microscopic objects. It
need not be assumed that correlations like those in EPR-Bell experiments do not
have causes (as is done e.g. by van Fraassen [21]). Quantum mechanics just does
not describe these causes. This can be compared to Newton’s interpretation of his
theory of gravitation, to the effect that this theory describes ‘just the phenomena’,
and does not yield any (mechanical) explanation of the way the gravitational force
is transmitted from the sun to a planet (about which Newton did not wish “to frame
hypotheses”). The ‘nonlocality’ problem of quantum mechanics, started by the EPR
challenge, is to be compared to the ‘actio-in-distans’ problem of the Newtonian the-
ory of gravitation: both are consequences of a realist interpretation of the theory,
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asking from the theory explanations it is not able to give.
Hence, an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics is not at variance
with metaphysical realism (“the theory that the objects of scientific enquiry exist
and act, for the most part, quite independently of scientists and their activity”
(Bashkar [49])). However, in order to describe the microscopic objects themselves
new (subquantum) theories have to be developed, analogous to the field theories that
nowadays are thought to be able to yield an explanation of Newton’s ‘action-at-a-
distance’. It should be stressed that, far from denying the possibility of subquan-
tum (hidden-variables) theories, an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics
leaves considerably more room for such theories than is allowed for by a realist
interpretation, precisely because quantum mechanics is not thought to describe mi-
croscopic reality as such.
The empiricist interpretation should also be distinguished from the Copenhagen
interpretation, which, although having an empiricist reputation, actually contains
many realist elements. Nevertheless, the empiricist interpretation is indebted to
the Copenhagen one by taking seriously the importance attributed to the role of
the measuring instrument in assessing the meaning of the quantum mechanical for-
malism. But the empiricist interpretation differs from the Copenhagen one by not
considering a quantum mechanical measurement result to be a property of the mi-
croscopic object (either before, during, or after the measurement), but to correspond
to a macroscopic event in the macroscopic part of a measuring instrument (pointer)
that can be recorded in an unequivocal way either by direct observation or by means
of registration by some memory device. Hence, the information transfer from the
microscopic object to the measuring instrument must be taken into account. In
agreement with the criticism of the correspondence principle given in section 6, the
quantum mechanical formalism is applied to the interaction of object and measuring
instrument.
One reason not to equate the professed empiricism of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion with an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics as defined here, is that
the discussion between Bohr and Einstein took place completely within the confines
of a realist interpretation. For Einstein this was the natural interpretation, in which
the reality described by a wave function is that of an ensemble, and an observable
is thought to be an objective property of the microscopic object. Bohr departed
from Einstein’s interpretation of an observable only by replacing an objectivistically
realist interpretation by a contextualistically realist one. Admittedly, Bohr’s instru-
mentalist interpretation of the wave function, as well as his reference to “the possible
types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system” in his answer [10]
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to EPR sound vaguely empiricist. However, because Bohr, while leaning heavily on
the strong form of the correspondence principle, restricted his considerations mainly
to observables (physical quantities), this empiricism, if existing at all, did not carry
much weight. In particular, his failure to notice the difference between EPR and
EPR-Bell experiments demonstrates that for Bohr, like for Einstein, a quantum me-
chanical measurement result is a property of the microscopic object rather than a
property of a macroscopic measuring instrument.
In many textbooks of quantum mechanics the way the state vector is dealt with
can also hardly be distinguished from a realist one, even when adherence to the
Copenhagen (orthodox) interpretation is acknowledged. The paradoxes stemming
from this inclination towards realism have plagued the quantum mechanical liter-
ature over the years, and it has been realized many times that a more empiricist
approach could solve most, if not all, problems (e.g. Wheeler [50]). On the other
hand, it has been the Copenhagen reference to ‘measurement’ in the interpretation
of quantum mechanics, which has been a bone of contention to those believing that
quantum mechanics is applicable outside the context of a measurement. This is
worded in a fairly dramatic way, for instance, by Popper ([34], p. 2): “It seems to
me that the attack on realism, though intellectually interesting and important, is
quite unacceptable, especially after two world wars and the real suffering - avoidable
suffering - that was wantonly produced by them; and that any argument against re-
alism which is based on modern atomic theory - on quantum mechanics - ought to
be silenced by the memory of the reality for the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”
It seems to me, however, that judgments like Popper’s one given above are based
on an identification of empiricism and anti-realism, which is hardly defensible in
general. It does not seem reasonable to treat a modest assessment of the meaning
of a physical theory (as merely describing certain observed aspects of reality) as if
this view would deny all reality behind the phenomena.
Perhaps Popper can be excused because, due to the idea of ‘completeness of
quantum mechanics in a wider sense’ it could be thought that the Copenhagen in-
terpretation endorses such an anti-realist view. However, as was seen in section 2.1,
such a contention can hardly be attributed to the Copenhagen interpretation be-
cause it is rather ‘completeness of quantum mechanics in a restricted sense’ that is
characteristic of this interpretation. Whether this latter concept is applicable to the
violent events that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, depends on the question
of what is the domain of application of quantum mechanics. Application of quan-
tum mechanics to macroscopic events may be possible to a certain extent, but we
should be aware of the possibility that such events may transcend the domain of
application of the theory (even though the theory may work well for a description of
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certain aspects of the microscopic processes that are involved). For a description of
microscopic events quantum mechanics may play an analogous role to the one played
by the theory of rigid bodies in describing solids: the theory may describe certain
features of reality as they are under certain conditions defining the domain of appli-
cation of the theory; under extreme conditions the theory may become inapplicable,
and new theories will be needed to describe features of reality not covered by it.
Unfortunately, in Popper’s philosophy of science a theory’s domain of application is
largely absent.
Virtually all paradoxes that over the years have plagued quantum mechanics
stem from a realist interpretation. Sometimes it is possible to alleviate a problem
by relaxing from an individual-particle interpretation to an ensemble one, thus as-
suming, like in Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox, that the wave function does not describe
the reality of a single cat but of an ensemble of cats. However, the persistence of
the so-called ‘cross terms’ in the density operator keeps provoking a necessity of
appealing to ‘observation’ in order to account for their unobservability (e.g. Jauch
[45], chapter 11). In contrast to Einstein’s contention, an ensemble interpretation of
the wave function does not solve all problems. The EPR problem, discussed in sec-
tion 5, is a case in point here. An objectivistic-realist interpretation of conditional
preparation of the particle 2 ensemble by a measurement on particle 1 keeps being
problematic (although less acutely than in an individual-particle interpretation) be-
cause it attributes, for each member of the ensemble of particle pairs, to particle 2
sharp values of both incompatible observables B
(s)
2 and B
′
2. An empiricist interpre-
tation offers an alternative to the nonlocality of Bohr’s contextualistic realism by
interpreting a transition from state vector |ψ12〉 (3) to the state vector |β
(s)
2i 〉 not as
a transition to a description of a subensemble of the ensemble of particles 2, but
as a transition to a new preparation procedure for particles 2, in which the latter
particles are selected on the basis of the measurement results read off the measuring
instrument for particle 1. Since such a preparation procedure is manifestly causal
the nonlocality problem does not arise.
It is important to note that an empiricist interpretation of EPR in this vein is
not liable to the problem facing Einstein’s solution on the basis of an objectivistic-
realist ensemble interpretation, to the effect that according to the latter interpreta-
tion well-defined values of incompatible observables would be attributable to each
particle of the ensemble, thus causing the problems of the Kochen-Specker and Bell
type referred to in sections 2 and 6. In an empiricist interpretation in the EPR
experiment particle 2 is not thought to acquire a well-defined value of B
(s)
2 as soon
as a value of A
(s)
1 is ascertained. Such a value is obtained only if the observable
is actually measured (as is the case in an EPR-Bell experiment). Hence, in a way
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an empiricist interpretation subscribes to Jordan’s view that a quantum mechanical
measurement result is created during a measurement. However, it is not created as
a property of the microscopic object, but as a property of the measuring instrument
(pointer position), which, for this reason, should be actually present. It should be
noted that procedures like conditional preparation of particle 2 in the EPR exper-
iment are not at all exceptional. They are quite common experimental procedures
for preparing microscopic objects “in certain well-defined states” (for instance, the
Compton-Simon experiment). Note, however, that in an empiricist interpretation
the realist terminology, in which a state vector is thought to represent the result
of a preparation, should be replaced to the effect that the wave function is rather
representing the preparation itself. For describing states of the microscopic objects
we have to take recourse to subquantum theories.
The neo-Copenhagen interpretation developed in the present paper endorses an
empiricist interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism. By thus weaken-
ing the interpretation paradoxes can be evaded. Far from “restrict(ing) quantum
mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory operations” this allows ap-
plication of the theory to any preparation procedure representable by a quantum
mechanical state vector or density operator: it is not necessary that the preparation
be man-made. However, things are different with respect to observables (repre-
sented by Hermitian operators or POVMs). Quantum mechanics is intended in the
first place to describe observations made by means of measuring instruments de-
vised especially so as to create macroscopic phenomena, the relative frequencies of
which can be registered conditionally on a certain preparation procedure. In the
neo-Copenhagen interpretation quantum mechanics is thought just to describe re-
lations between preparations and such measurement phenomena, which, however,
are not to be interpreted in Bohr’s realist sense but in the sense of an empiricist
interpretation. Quantum mechanical measurement results refer to pointer positions
of quantum mechanical measuring instruments. What is a quantum mechanical
measuring instrument cannot be defined independently of the theory (i.e. quantum
mechanics) itself. It is a matter of experience whether a certain experimental proce-
dure is a valid measurement procedure within the domain of application of quantum
mechanics. In particular, this domain has been appreciably extended as a conse-
quence of the discovery that Hermitian operators do not exhaust all possibilities of
representing quantum mechanical measurements.
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12 Subquantum theories
An interesting question, relevant to the neo-Copenhagen interpretation because it
denies to quantum mechanics ‘completeness in a wider sense’, is a characterization
of that theory’s domain of application. As yet, we do not have any experimental clue
helping us to answer this question, and necessary for knowing what kind of theories
will be suitable for transcending quantum mechanics. Most attempts at devising
subquantum theories had the intention to restore a classical, often deterministic,
view (e.g. Bohm [51]). We do not have any reason, however, to think that at a
submicroscopic level the world will be more similar to our macroscopic one than it
is at the microscopic level.
Whereas the Copenhagen interpretation had the opportunity to neglect ques-
tions with respect to subquantum theories on the basis of a completeness claim of
quantum mechanics (even though ill-understood), the neo-Copenhagen interpreta-
tion has to take these questions seriously. In particular, it has to cope with an
alleged nonlocality, induced by derivations of the Bell inequalities from subquantum
theories, even after it has been possible to banish the ghost of nonlocality at the
quantum level by switching from a realist to an empiricist interpretation. However,
as will be argued in the following, the nonlocality claim, based on violation of the
Bell inequalities by certain EPR-Bell experiments, actually is a consequence of a
completeness claim of the subquantum theory used, in the sense that it is assumed
that this theory will describe all possible measurements, including quantum me-
chanical ones. It is not necessary to conclude that nonlocality is the cause of this
violation if in the theory additional assumptions are made that are not satisfied in
reality, and, therefore, make the theory inapplicable even if it is local. It is not
even plausible that in case of quantum mechanical measurements nonlocality is the
cause, because the possibility of violating the Bell inequalities by quantum mechan-
ical measurements hinges on incompatibility of quantum mechanical observables,
which, due to the (unchallenged) postulate of local commutativity, is a local affair.
It is very well possible that the classical paradigm, referred to above, is such an
additional assumption. In the following it is demonstrated how by getting rid of
this paradigm also at the level of subquantum theories the ghost of nonlocality can
be driven off.
Let us first briefly review derivations of the Bell inequalities from hidden vari-
ables theory. Allegedly ([52]) the most general one has been given by Clauser and
Horne [53]. It is based on the following representation of the quantum mechanical
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probability pi of measurement result ai of quantum mechanical observable A:
pi =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ) pA(ai|λ). (13)
Here λ is a submicroscopic (hidden) variable, to be compared with the phase space
point (q, p) of classical mechanics, phase space being generalized to the hidden vari-
ables space Λ. The probability of λ is given by ρ(λ). The quantity pA(ai|λ) is the
conditional probability of measurement result ai for given λ. It actually is a rep-
resentation of the detection process. If pA(ai|λ) can have only values 0 and 1 the
theory is called deterministic (this might implement the idea of ‘faithful measure-
ment’, which does not have a meaning in an empiricist interpretation of quantum
mechanics). It should be realized that this determinism refers only to the detec-
tion process; the free evolution in phase space, governing the time dependence of
ρ(λ), may be either deterministic or indeterministic. Since pA(ai|λ) may depend
on the measurement procedure used for measuring observable A, this theory can
even account for contextuality of quantum mechanical observables. For EPR-Bell
experiments (13) is generalized to
pij =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ) pA1A2(a1i, a2j |λ), pA1A2(a1i, a2j |λ) = pA1(a1i|λ)pA2(a2j |λ), (14)
in which the assumption of locality is implemented by a condition of conditional
statistical independence of the bivariate conditional probabilities pA1A2(a1i, a2j |λ),
the conditional probability of observable A being independent of B (and vice versa).
A simple way to prove that the detection probabilities of the pairs of observables
(A1, A2), (A1, B2), (B1, A2), and (B1, B2) satisfy the Bell inequalities (de Muynck
et al. [54]) relies on the possibility to construct, on the basis of the validity of
representation (14) for each of these measurements, the quadrivariate probability
distribution
pijkℓ =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ) pA1(a1i|λ) pB1(b1j |λ) pA2(a2k|λ) pB2(b2ℓ|λ). (15)
The widely accepted idea that the quantum world must be nonlocal is based
on the assumption that locality is the only presupposition in deriving the Bell in-
equalities from this theory, thus enabling to pinpoint nonlocality as the only pos-
sible cause of their violation in EPR-Bell measurements. Yet, there is still another
assumption involved in the representations (13) and (14) of quantum mechanical
detection probabilities. It is important to note that in these expressions by a con-
ditional probability like pA(ai|λ) quantum mechanical measurement results ai are
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conditioned on an instantaneous value of hidden variable λ. Is it reasonable to as-
sume that a quantum mechanical measurement result ai is determined, even in a
stochastic sense, by such an instantaneous value? If so, what is the precise instant of
time at which the value of λ should be taken in the conditional probabilities? Given
the possibility that λ is fluctuating very fast even compared to the characteristic
transition times of quantum phenomena, it is probable that a quantum mechanical
measurement does not probe an instantaneous value of λ at all, but (a part of) a
trajectory λ¯, much in the same way a (thermodynamic) measurement of tempera-
ture or pressure does not probe an instantaneous value of (q, p) in classical statistical
thermodynamics. Subquantum theories of the types in which quantum mechanical
measurement results are conditioned on λ (λ¯) are referred to as quasi-objectivistic
(non-quasi-objectivistic) subquantum theories in de Muynck [12].
The analogy between quantum mechanics and statistical thermodynamics has
been drawn many times before (e.g. de Broglie [55], Bohm et al. [56, 57], Nelson
[58, 59], Davidson [60], Du¨rr et al. [61]). If the analogy is sound, this implies that
quantum mechanical measurements may not be fast enough to probe subquantum
fluctuations. This means that for application to quantum mechanical measurements
the conditional probabilities pA(ai|λ) should probably be replaced by pA(ai|λ¯), and
the expression (13) by a density functional like
pi =
∫
Λ¯
dλ¯ ρ(λ¯) pA(ai|λ¯), (16)
in which Λ¯ is a space of possible trajectories λ¯, and ρ(λ¯) is a probability distribution
of these trajectories. The difference between λ and λ¯ marks the distinction between
subquantum elements of physical reality and quantum mechanical ones, referred to
in section 2.3.
By itself a transition from (13) to (16) is not sufficient to block derivation of
the Bell inequalities, since in (15), too, λ could be replaced by λ¯, thus allowing the
construction of a quadrivariate probability distribution even if all conditional prob-
abilities are conditioned on trajectories. In order to prevent such a construction it is
useful to remember that, as far as quantum mechanical measurements probe reality,
they probe a contextual reality (cf. section 9). In a subquantum theory describing
such measurements this contextuality might be implemented by a contextuality of
the trajectory λ¯, which could be co-determined by the experimental arrangement
in the same way as the canonical state Z−1e−H/kT of classical statistical thermody-
namics is co-determined by it (for instance, by the shape of the container of a gas).
For this reason, in the context of a measurement of quantum mechanical observable
A in (16) the trajectory λ¯ has to be replaced by a trajectory λ¯A that is dependent
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on the measurement arrangement. Hence, instead of (16) we get
pi =
∫
Λ¯A
dλ¯A ρ(λ¯A) pA(ai|λ¯
A), (17)
in which Λ¯A is the space of trajectories allowed within the context of a measurement
of observable A.
Contextuality implies that it is natural to assume that for incompatible observ-
ables A and B (characterized by mutually exclusive measurement arrangements) we
in general have
λ¯A 6= λ¯B. (18)
Hence, even if in different experiments the object were prepared in the same hidden
variable state λ, the trajectories are distinct if the measurement arrangements are
mutually exclusive. For incompatible observables we also have
Λ¯A 6= Λ¯B.
Now the important point is that in the representations (17) of probability distribu-
tions of incompatible observables the conditional probabilities cannot be conditioned
on the same states (trajectories). As a consequence, the construction, analogous to
(15), of a quadrivariate probability distribution fails, and the Bell inequalities can-
not be derived any more (even though these may be satisfied for measurements in
the subquantum domain, fast enough to probe the instantaneous value of λ).
The assumption that quantum mechanical measurements do not probe the in-
stantaneous value of λ, but only (contextual) trajectories λ¯A is sufficient to break
the unnatural connection widely supposed to exist between nonlocality and violation
of the Bell inequalities. Derivation of the Bell inequalities for EPR-Bell experiments
like those performed by Aspect et al. [42, 43] is impossible, then, because an object
cannot be in the same state (trajectory) for all of the four different measurements
involved. This explanation is in agreement with the fact that incompatibility is a
necessary condition for the Bell inequalities to be violated. Since in an EPR-Bell
experiment the trajectory of each of the particles of the particle pair can be thought
to be locally co-determined by its own measurement arrangement, the solution pro-
posed here for subquantum theory is essentially the same as the one proposed for
quantum mechanics (cf. section 7). No nonlocal influences are necessary to violate
the Bell inequalities.
It is interesting to consider the possibility that an individual preparation within
the context of a measurement of observable A might be describable by a trajectory
λ¯(A,ai), yielding with certainty measurement result ai if the measurement is a faithful
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one. This would restore determinism of the measurement process, to the effect that
a measurement result ai refers in a deterministic way to a subquantum state, be
it a trajectory. A connection between quantum mechanics and the subquantum
theory proposed here might be provided by the contextual state ρA (8), which may
be referring to the preparation of the subquantum states (trajectories) λ¯(A,ai) in an
ensemble symbolically represented by the (statistical) state λ¯A, relative frequencies
being given by (8). In general λ¯(A,ai) 6= λ¯(B,bj) if A and B are incompatible.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the solution presented here corroborates a
certain nonlocality of quantum mechanics (e.g. de Muynck [62]) quite different from
the nonlocality involved in the usual explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities.
This nonlocality has to do with the domain of application of a theory, delimiting
the kind of objects described by it. Thus, an electron is not a point particle, but
it is an extended object. However, within the domain of application of quantum
mechanics it is to be considered as a (nonlocal/inseparable) whole, in the same way
a billiard ball in the theory of rigid bodies, or a volume of gas in a thermodynamic
equilibrium state is to be considered an inseparable whole. This does not imply that
the objects are really nonlocal objects, in the interior of which nonlocal interactions
would be responsible for inseparability, or for relative immobility of its parts. What
it means is that within the domain of application of the relevant theory the objects
can be considered as primitive entities. When experimentally leaving the domain
of application of the theory the apparent nonlocality may disappear, analogously to
the impossibility of staying within the domain of application of rigid body theory
under experimental conditions capable of splitting a billiard ball.
13 Summary
In this paper an interpretation of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
is proposed, remedying the confusions and inconsistencies of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation while maintaining the essential role attributed by the latter interpretation
to the interaction of microscopic object and measuring instrument. For this latter
reason it is proposed to refer to the new interpretation as a neo-Copenhagen one. It
has particularly been inspired by the recent insight that, in order to encompass all
possible measurements within the domain of quantum mechanics, it is necessary to
generalize the mathematical representation of quantum mechanical observables to
positive operator-valued measures, thus making obsolete the preferred position Her-
mitian operators have in the Copenhagen interpretation (as well as in most other
interpretations). Thus, von Neumann’s projection postulate is not applicable to
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generalized observables. Another reason to refer to the Copenhagen interpretation
is that the notion of complementarity as a consequence of mutual disturbance in a
joint measurement of incompatible observables remains one of the cornerstones of
the new interpretation.
In the neo-Copenhagen interpretation the empiricist tendencies, to be observed
in the Copenhagen interpretation but not implemented there in a consistent way,
are taken seriously. By adopting an empiricist interpretation in which the mathe-
matical formalism is taken to refer to macroscopic procedures of preparation and
measurement rather than to the microscopic object, the paradoxes haunting quan-
tum mechanics can be solved. In particular, the nonlocality problem, induced by the
EPR experiment, does not exist any more. The contextual meaning of quantum me-
chanics, underlined by Bohr’s analysis of the EPR proposal, is corroborated, but at
the same time corrected by drawing a distinction between measurement and prepa-
ration, largely neglected in the Copenhagen interpretation. Bohr’s instrumentalist
interpretation of the wave function as well as Einstein’s realist ensemble interpreta-
tion are shown to be wanting.
The discussion on the issue of the completeness of quantum mechanics is shown
to be very confusing because two different notions of completeness are at stake. It is
argued that an empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics leaves room for sub-
quantum theories. The concomitant nonlocality problem induced by the violation of
the Bell inequalities is analyzed, and shown to be a consequence of a too restricted
subquantum theory, unjustifiedly conditioning quantum mechanical measurement
results on instantaneous values of the subquantum (hidden) variables. A comparison
of the relation between quantum mechanics and such (quasi-objectivistic) subquan-
tum theories with similar relations between theories describing physical phenomena
at different levels of observation, demonstrates that presumably the assumption of
quasi-objectivity cannot be maintained. Contrary to Bell’s contention that nonlo-
cality is the essential assumption allowing to derive the Bell inequalities, it is rather
the assumption of quasi-objectivity (overlooked by Bell) that may be responsible.
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